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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("Act"),' as2
amended, most recently in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLB") divides all economic activity into five groups. These
groups are:
1. Banking;
Professor of Law at the Fordham University School of Law and Director of its Institute
on Law and Financial Services.
....
Senior Associate, Pinci & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY; Rome University
School of
Law ("La Sapienza,") Visiting Student, 1991; University of Tirana School of Law, J.D.,
1992; Georgetown University International Law Institute, Diploma, 1994; Fordham
University School of Law, L.L.M., 1998; Admitted to the New York State Bar, 1999. This
article does not necessarily represent the views of the firm and its clients. I owe great
thanks and special gratitude to Prof. Carl Felsenfeld (co-author) for sharing his extensive
thoughts, insightful comments and overall guidance, without which this article would
have been impossible to write.
1. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA"), Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (2000) & 26 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1103 (2000)).
2.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 ("GLB"), Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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2. Activities closely related to and a proper incident
to banking;
3. Activities of a financial nature;
4. Activities complementary to those of a financial
nature; and
5. Activities not of a financial nature.
This article will explore these five groups of activities
separately. The policies behind the divisions will be analyzed
and questioned whether they serve the policies behind the Act.
This article will also question whether the divisions make good
economic sense and whether they are drawn in a logical manner.
Finally, this article examines the effects that the divisions have
had on the banking industry, in both the United States and
abroad, and looks to what they portend for the future.
The five areas of activity represent the Act as it now stands.
The Act has always divided the economic world into discrete
groups of activities, but those specific groups have changed as the
Act evolved and was amended in response to changing conditions.
The GLB, enacted in 1999, was a response to a changed
technological world that made banking law unresponsive to
economic needs both domestically and, perhaps even more
importantly, internationally. Although the changes might have
been ground-breaking at one time, contemporary electronic
technology, combined with forward-looking regulatory and
judicial decisions, may have sufficiently affected the system to
make the changes largely irrelevant.4
Before the GLB, there was one other significant amendment,
which was enacted in 1970. 5 This amendment created the second
division listed above (activities "closely related" to and a "proper
3.
4.

See GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a), (c)(8), (k), (n) (2000).
See Eugene M. Katz, Securities Activities, Merchant Banking and Functional

Regulation Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 182 (2002)

(stating "the reforms adopted by the GLB Act simply validate what the marketplace
already had demanded"); see Peter J. Wallison, Address at the American Enterprise for
Public Policy Research (Dec. 19, 2001), http://aei.org/sp/spwallison011219.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002) (expressing "[t]he sad thing about all this is that it is all so
unnecessary").
5.
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 ("1970 Amendments"), Pub. L.
No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
and 31 U.S.C.).
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incident" of banking).' That division was an important and
fundamental segment of the Act until the GLB reduced it to an
insignificance.
It is observed at the outset that the five groups of activities
are not even remotely alike in terms of either size or importance.
Next to the fourth group (activities complementary to those of a
financial nature), which has virtually no content at present, the
second group, once so prominent, is now probably the smallest
and least important. Conversely, the fifth group (activities not of
a financial nature) largely engulfs the remaining four.
II.

Banking

The concept of what is "banking" for purposes of the Bank
Holding Company Act 7 is addressed in two ways.
In a case before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Independent Insurance Agents of America challenged an order of
the Federal Reserve Board ("Board") that "permitted two Indiana
state banks acquired by the Merchants National Corporation, a
bank holding company, to resume specified insurance activities
permitted under Indiana law."8 In response to the plaintiffs
assertion that the activities were beyond the legal scope of bank
activities permitted under the Act, the Board contended it had no
power to inquire into the activities of a bank acquired by a
holding company.9 The Court of Appeals confirmed the Board's
position that one must "leave the scope of permissible activities of
bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company subject only to the
authority that issued the banks' charter, without any further
restriction from the [Bank Holding Company] Act itself.""
6.
GLB § 103; 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
7.
Outside the Bank Holding Company Act, the concept of "banking" takes on more
refined colorations. In connection with branching, one sees "core" banking functions. See
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 409 (1987) (holding a discount brokerage service
is not a core banking function). Related concepts in 12 U.S.C. § 81 deal with the "general
business" of banking. See 12 U.S.C. § 81 (2000).
8.
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275, 1277 (2d Cir.
1989).
9.
See id. at 1278-80 (explaining that the Board believed the Act's restrictions on
permitted activities applied only to activities of the bank holding company itself, not to
those of its acquired subsidiary). The Board did recognize, however, that under an
exception to the "ownership" clause of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, a bank holding company
may not acquire an entity that claims to be a "bank" but engages mostly in nonbanking
activities, noting that such an acquisition would be "'primarily, if not solely' for the
purpose of enabling the holding company to engage in the target's nonbanking activities."
Id. at 1279. The Second Circuit referred to a prior situation, in which Citicorp, a bank
holding company, had attempted such an evasive maneuver in order to invade the
insurance business. Id.; see Citicorp (South Dakota), 71 FED. RES. BULL. 789, 790 (1985).
10.
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 890 F.2d at 1279.
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Both the Board and the Court of Appeals based their
decisions in part on statements of the United States Supreme
Court in Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute."
In that case, the Supreme Court considered an interpretive
ruling of the Board that permitted "bank holding companies and12
their nonbanking subsidiaries to act as an investment adviser.'
Investment Company Institute argued the Board's ruling, in
effect, gave powers to a bank subsidiary beyond its permissible
scope. 3 The Institute also contended that the regulation wrongly
authorized banks themselves to engage in these activities. 4 The
Supreme Court provided a succinct response: "The simple answer
to this argument is that not only does the interpretive ruling
confer no authorization to undertake any activities, but also the
Board does not have the power to confer such authorization on
banks." 5 The Court found further support for its determination
in a quote from the Board's opinion, which stated, "[tlhe
authority of national banks or state member banks to furnish
investment advisory services does not derive from the Board's
regulation; such authority would exist independently of the
Board's regulation and its scope is to be 6determined by a
particular bank's primary supervisory agency."
Once one goes to "a particular bank's primary supervisory
agency" to determine the scope of a bank's authority to offer
investment advisory services, the laws are beyond the reach of,
and essentially irrelevant to, this article's purpose. The National
Bank Act 7 and the regulations of the Comptroller 8 control
activities of national banks; fifty different sets of state statutes
and supporting regulations have similar control over the state
bank system. 9 Other statutes, both federal and state, govern
savings and loan associations, ° savings banks' and other
11.

450 U.S. 46 (1981); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 890 F.2d at 1284; Merchants

National Corp., 75 FED. RES. BULL. 388 (1989).

12.
Bd. of Governors, 450 U.S. at 49.
13.
Id. at 53 (claiming the Board was not authorized to determine that investment
adviser services were "closely related" to banking).
14.
Id. at 60 n.25.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
National Bank Act of 1864, June 3, 1864, ch. 106., 13 Stat. 99 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 19, 31 U.S.C.).
18.
See 12 C.F.R. § l et seq. (2002).
19.
See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 1.001 et. seq. (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2002)
20.
See, e.g., Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 ("HOLA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 48 Stat.
128 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (2000)) (governing federal savings and loan
associations); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.007 (Vernon 1998) (setting forth the Texas
Savings and Loan Act).
21.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2001) (authorizing the "organization, incorporation,
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institutions that one might consider banks. The word "banking"
appears throughout this myriad of laws22 and, as already noted,
its various meanings in this context need not concern us.
When the Supreme Court determined that a national bank
could, within its banking powers, offer annuities to its customers
and was not restricted by state insurance limitations in doing
so, 23 its decision rested upon three bases. The first basis, and the
one for which the Court is most often cited, is that an annuity
contract is fundamentally a bank product - an "investment" rather than "insurance."2 4 The second basis is the principle that
when an agency properly assigned to a specific area reasonably
interprets a regulation within that area, the courts will affirm
the decision. 5 In this instance, the Supreme Court deferred to
the Comptroller of the Currency's decision an annuity was a
bank product that could be sold "as part of, or incidental to, the
business of banking. 2 ' The third basis is that national banks
have the power to act as agents in the sale of securities, which, as
mentioned above, include annuities. 7 Clearly, the power to act
as an agent belongs to national bank power.
The Supreme Court considered the language of the National
Bank Act authorizing a national bank "'to exercise... all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business
of banking ....
On their face, these words embody a
considerable discretionary ingredient; specifically, there does not
appear to be a clearly defined line marking the power's limits.
The NationsBank Court confirmed this view in a famous footnote

examination, operation, and regulation of... Federal savings associations (including
Federal savings banks)"); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 91.001-.007 (Vernon 1998) (setting
forth the Texas Savings Bank Act).
22.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (providing a national bank has the power "[t]o
exercise ...all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking"); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96 (McKinney 2001) (providing that every New York
bank has the power to "exercise all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on the business of banking").
23.
See NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 261-64
(1995).
24.
Id. at 259-61.
25.
Id. at 256-59.
26.
Id. at 259-60.
27.
Id. at 256-58 (discussing the provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh), which authorizes national banks to deal in securities). In a later case, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit a national bank to sell annuities
when the bank was acting as a principal rather than as an agent, and the court
distinguished NationsBank on this ground. See Blackfeet Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d
1237, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 1999).
28.
See NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. &
Supp. V) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000))).
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where the Court wrote: "We expressly hold that the 'business of
banking' is not limited to the enumerated powers in § 24
(Seventh) and that the Comptroller therefore has discretion
to
29
authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated."
The position taken by the Supreme Court in NationsBank
was consistent with earlier views on the nature of banking the
Comptroller of the Currency espoused. Particularly, in a 1989
Interpretive Letter, the Comptroller opined that it was legally
acceptable for national banks to broker financial instruments,
including agricultural futures and related options."
The
Comptroller reasoned this activity fell within the scope of the
"business of banking" powers clause under 12 U.S.C. Section 24
(Seventh).3 ' The Interpretive Letter referred several times to the
five examples of banking power within that provision and clearly
stated (consistent with the later NationsBank case): "[TIhe
National Bank Act grants the power to engage in the business of
banking which consists of more than only the five specifically
listed powers."3 2 Thus, the five enumerated powers are simply
examples of banking powers and not an exclusive list.33
Title 12 of the United States Code is the federal law defining
the powers of national banks.
State banks have similar
authorizations. For example, New York banking laws empower
its state banks to "exercise all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking."34 Even if a
national or state bank is part of a bank holding company system
over which the Board has general regulatory jurisdiction, the
Board cannot question the banking power given to the bank by
its authorizing law.35 We will look at that power from another
point of view - the concept of banking as a measure of activities
that may be conducted by affiliates of the bank in a holding
company system - in the following subsection.
29.
Id. at 258 n.2.
30.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 494, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,083, at 71,203 (Dec. 20, 1989).
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 71,197.
33.
See id. at 71,198.
34.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96(1) (McKinney 2001). It is not a coincidence that the
federal law reads so similarly to that of New York State, since the former was patterned
on the latter.
35.
See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275, 1279
(2d Cir. 1989) (noting the Board interpreted the Bank Holding Act as "leav[ing] the scope
of permissible activities of bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company subject only to
the authority that issued the banks' charter, without any further restriction from the Act
itself').
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The Act was enacted in 1956 and substantially amended in
1970.6 In both iterations, the bank holding company's authority
to engage in business through corporate entities other than
chartered banks themselves was carefully defined. 7 In both
situations, the definitions were based upon the relationship of
those entities to banking. However, the concept of banking was
different for this purpose in the periods before and after 1970.
Bank holding companies that had been controlled by the Act
before the 1970 amendment 8 were tightly constrained in the
permissible nonbank businesses they could conduct outside of
their bank(s). The ability to engage in any business outside the
bank itself required prior Board approval.3 9' The Act permitted
affiliates of banks covered by the Act and within a holding
company structure to engage in businesses of a "financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature..,
which the Board...
determined to be so closely related to the business of banking...
as to be a proper incident thereto .. . ."" The Board interpreted
"business of banking" to mean such banking business as banks
actually conducted in the same holding company system as the
applicant. 4' The Board wrote in 1959:
The fact that insurance may be considered as
generally related to the banking business and in
many respects similar to that business would not
alone be sufficient to justify an exemption under
Section 4(c)(6) of the Holding Company Act. In
view of the language of the statute and of the
Board's Regulation Y, it is essential that the
activities
of
the
company
involved-the
contemplated insurance activities of Agencies, Inc.
in the present case-must have some direct and
significant connection with the business of banking

36.
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (2000); 1970 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-607,
84 Stat. 1760.
37.
BHCA § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843; 1970 Amendments § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)
(2000).
38.
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for the discussion pertaining to
how bank holding companies that controlled only one bank were not regulated by the Act
until 1971.
39.
See BHCA § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. at 137 (1956) (allowing Board to approve such
activities by order, only "after due notice and hearing, and on the basis of the record made
at such hearing..
40.
Id.
41.

See First Bank Stock Corporation, 45 FED. RES. BULL. 917, 930 (1959).
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or of managing and controlling banks as conducted
by the Applicant or its banking subsidiaries.4 2
Thus, before 1970, for purposes of the Act, one meaning of
"banking" was the banking business as conducted by the bank in
the particular holding company.
It was of no consequence
whether other banks outside the holding company also engaged
in the activity. This is essentially the concept of banking that is
addressed in this subdivision of the article. Finding out what
"banking" meant was a much simpler exercise before 1970. One
only had to look at the actual holding company being considered
and see what activities its subsidiary bank(s) took part in.
This first concept of banking under the Act - an activity that
cannot be regulated by the Board - remains a cogent subject
today. The legal doctrine has remained essentially unchanged
through the life of the Bank Holding Company Act. As we will
see in the next subdivision, however, the second concept of
banking has lost most of its significance since the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999 was enacted.
The second concept of banking, a more difficult concept than
the first, is the group of activities considered "closely related to
banking" under Section 4 of the Act as amended in 1970. 4" The
concept of "closely related to banking" did not figure into the Act
at all until the amendment. The 1970 Amendment derived from
experience with one-bank holding companies. Before 1970, a
bank holding company that controlled only a single bank was not
a "bank holding company" as defined in the Act and,
consequently, was not regulated by the Act.44 Essentially, in
addition to controlling its one bank, this form of holding company
could engage in any type of activity.45 By Act of Congress
approved December 31, 1970, the Bank Holding Company Act
was expanded to cover one-bank holding companies." By the
42.
Id.
43.
1970 Amendments § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (amending BHCA § 4).
44. BHCA § 2(a), 70 Stat. at 133 (1956) (defining a "'bank holding company as "any
company (1) which directly or indirectly own, controls, or holds with power to vote, 25 per
centum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks...").
45.
In general, these bank holding companies were ordinary stock corporations,
which are empowered by their controlling laws to engage in any activity, subject to
certain limited exceptions like banking or insurance. One of the authors of this article
was employed by a one-bank holding company during those untroubled days. It owned a
greeting card company, a department store, an X-Ray manufacturing company, an
investment advisor and more. It considered itself a well-balanced conglomerate and
nicely insulated from market risk. With the 1970 Amendments, of course, it was required
to divest itself of that protection.
46.
See 1970 Amendments § 101 (deleting the "two or more banks" language).
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1970 amendment, Congress structured the Act so that both onebank and multi-bank holding companies were covered and
allowed to engage in a wide variety of nonbank activities .4
Congress first amended Section 4(c)(8) of the Act (under
which bank holding companies may acquire interests in
nonbanking activities), then continued to give the Board
supervision over all decisions, and finally made any Board
approval subject to certain restrictions and conditions.48 Under
that section, as amended, the Board was empowered to issue
orders and promulgate regulations generally permitting the
acquisition of companies whose activities were "so closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto."49
Insofar as the concept of banking is
concerned, the main effect of the amendment was to turn the
previous "business of banking" into just "banking."
In its first public action under the new provision, by order of
the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Board publicly
released on January 21, 1971, less than a month after approval of
the amendment, a proposal that ten activities be considered50
"'closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks.'
The release clarified that the Board was concerned mainly with
"banking" rather than "managing or controlling banks." 5' After a
hearing on April 14, 1971, in which Board members heard all
issues raised by the proposals, the Board approved seven of the
ten proposed activities.52
Efforts to discover what the Board used as a standard for
banking in evaluating what activities should be "closely related
to banking" have been less than satisfying. The "hearing" held
on April 14, 1971, where members of the Board considered "all
issues raised by the proposals," did not rise to the level of a
"meeting." No minutes were taken, or at least none remain.
5
There was, however, a reference to "the record of the hearing," 1

47.
See § 103, Stat. at 1763-64 (1970).
48.
See § 103.
49.
§ 103(4).
50.
Bank Holding Companies Interests in Nonbanking Activities, 36 Fed. Reg. 1430,
1430-31 (Jan. 29, 1971) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 222).
51.
Id. On the second page of the January 29, 1971 Federal Register release, the
Board observed that it must consider whether activities are "closely related to banking"
without ever referring to the "managing or controlling banks" language. See 36 Fed. Reg.
at 1431. That approach has dominated the Board throughout its administration of the
Act.
52.
Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 36 Fed. Reg. 10777 (June 3,
1971) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 222).
53.
See id. at 1077.
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which probably means that a transcript was created and is now
available from the Board under the Freedom of Information Act.
The Board seemingly did not feel it necessary to find a clear
and specific concept of banking to which the activities presented
to it for approval would be related. Should banking mean an
activity conducted by this bank, by all banks, by some banks, by
most banks, by many banks? One senses that an activity
assigned to a bank in Montana, for example, and performed only
for a single day would not be banking, as the Board comprehends
the term. Something more seems required, but one could not be
sure in 1971 what it was.
Throughout the next few years, the Board continued
deciding what was "closely related to banking" without actually
defining the term "banking." However, a sense that something
beyond a casual act or activity of a single bank seemed to hover
over its decisions. For example, in 1974 an applicant was
reported to have presented an activity to the Board as being
"traditionally H performed by banks, and ... in Applicant's
opinion, [and presumably at least partly for that reason] closely
related to banking., 54 Later the same year, the Board decided
underwriting mortgage guaranty insurance was "similar to those
[credit decisions] made by banks in their regular course of
business.
In deciding what a bank holding company may do as
related to the issue of whether an activity is closely related to
banking, this somewhat indistinct test seemingly assumed that
the activities of a bank holding company, a federally regulated
entity, should not vary from state to state based upon what the
local banks may do. We find no decision, however, that deems
"banking" to be what a single bank can do or even what banks in
a particular geographic area may do.
Approximately four years after the Board made its initial
determination of what constituted activities "closely related to
banking," the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
National CourierAss'n v. Board of Governors, became the first
appellate court to give some formal guidance as to the meaning of
"banking."5' National Courier remains the seminal decision
interpreting when an activity should be deemed "closely related"
to banking for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act 1970

54.
Bank Holding Companies, 39 Fed. Reg. 13,007 (Apr. 10, 1974) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
55.
Bank Holding Companies Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies,
39 Fed. Reg. 33,712, 33,712 (Sept. 19, 1974) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). The
activity was, however, rejected for other reasons.
56.
Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

COPYRIGHT 0 2003 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

76 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAXLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. III

Amendments. Despite its significance, however, the case was
less thorough than it could have been. Given the opportunity to
analyze what Congress contemplated as "banking" following the
57
1970 Amendments, the court largely declined the invitation
beyond analyzing the legislative history of the words. 58 Most of
the court's contributions to the subject now at issue, however,
came indirectly or by assumption.
The court properly quoted the operative words in the Bank
Holding Company Act - "banking or managing or controlling
banks" - and subsequently eliminated all but the word "banking"
as if "managing or controlling banks" added nothing, 5' as perhaps
they do not. It then determined that "[t]he Board must...
articulate the ways in which banking activities and the proposed
activities are assertedly connected, and must determine, not
arbitrarily or capriciously, that the connections are close."60
Explaining this statement, the court required a bank's proposed
services to have been provided by banks "generally" in order for
there to be a connection.6 '
This word had not previously
appeared in the published discussions of the Act.
The court's holding that an activity must be engaged in by
banks generally to constitute banking for purposes of Section 4 of
the Bank Holding Company Act, and not by a single balk or even
a limited group of banks, was adopted by subsequent decisions
and has become a foundation of the Act.6 2 Thus, if the legislature
of the State of Nevada had empowered its banks to offer as a
banking activity the business of gambling, it would be considered
banking in Nevada for purposes of subsection 1 above; and, since
banks could conduct the activity, it would be regulated by the
57. See id.at 1237 (stating, "[r]ather than define ['closely related to banking'] with
any precision ... we simply require that the Board go about making its 'closely related'
decision in a reasoned fashion consistent with the legislative intent"). The court first
addressed the concept before the 1970 Amendments, "closely related to the business of
banking." Id. at 1236. Next the Nat'l CourierAss'n court determined that Congress
intended an entirely new test according to the changed language. Id. at 1236-37.
However, other than indicating that a broader set of activities was to be included than
just those engaged in by the affiliate bank, the court did not pursue the issue of how those
activities were to be identified. Id.
58.
See id. at 1236.
59.
See id. at 1236-37.
60.
Id. at 1237. Thus, once the Board established what "banking" constituted, its
next task was to determine whether the activity presented to it was "closely related." Id.
See discussion infra Part III.
61.
Id. at 1232-33.
62.
See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d
677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 24041 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Sec. Indus. Ass'n
v. Bd. of Governors, 716 F.2d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1983), affd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (refusing to
read this requirement into the language of the Act).
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state banking commission and, absent fraud in the CiticorpSouth Dakota sense, 3 could not be authorized, prohibited or
controlled by the Board. However, gambling would not be
"banking" in the sense of this subsection because it would not be
offered by banks generally; and, as a consequence, an activity
closely related to gambling could not be engaged in by a nonbank affiliate, not even in Nevada.
Following the National Courier case, the term "generally"
appeared regularly when the Board applied the "closely-related"
test. For instance, in a 1976 opinion considering the relationship
of the travel agency business to banking, the Board looked to
whether banks "generally have provided the proposed service. " "
Finding that one percent of all commercial banks in the United
States conducted this particular business and that these banks
account for less than two percent of all travel agencies, the Board
held that the travel agency business was not "closely related" to
banking."
In addition, in 1976, the Board found automobile leasing to
be "closely related" to banking, based in large part upon "a
strictly factual test of whether banks generally have provided
and do provide the proposed service."" Specifically, the Board
determined automobile leasing had spread nationwide during the
preceding twelve to fifteen years and was engaged in by 680
banks during the early 1970's.17
In considering the relationship of municipal securities
dealerships to banking, the Board decided it was premature to
render a final decision on whether the two were "closely related"
because the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, created in
1975, was itself considering regulations covering such
dealerships. 8 The Board stated, however, that it "believes that
there is support for a determination that the activity is 'closely
related to banking' and "that an activity generally engaged in by
banks directly would seem to qualify as 'closely related' to
banking or managing
or controlling banks within the meaning of
69
the statute."
If the National Bank Act specifically permits a national bank
to engage in a particular type of activity, is this enough to be
63.

See Citicorp (South Dakota), 71 FED. RES. BULL. 789, 790.

64.
Bank Holding Companies Nonbanking Activities, 41 Fed. Reg. 5134, 5135
(Feb. 4, 1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
65.
Id.
66.

Bank Holding Companies, 62 FED. RES. BULL. 928, 931 (1976).

67.

Id.

68.
See Bank Holding Companies Nonbanking Activities, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,083,
47,083 (Oct. 27, 1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
69.
Id.
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considered banking "generally?"
After all, in 1971,
approximately 4,600 national banks0 existed that were located in
all states. Would more be required to meet the "generally" test?
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Alabama Ass'n of Insurance
Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors was presented with the
opportunity to address this question. 7 ' The case focused on a
specific provision of the National Bank Act that granted national
banks authority to act as an agent for the sale of insurance in
any place with a population that does not exceed 5,000.72 The
Board had built a regulation upon this provision that granted
certain authorities to non-bank affiliates within a holding
company system. 73 The regulation was challenged and the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Board had
extended the fundamental banking authority too broadly.74 The
court did not deny, indeed, could not deny, that acting as an
agent in any place with a population of 5,000 or less was part of a
national bank's authority.7 5 It analyzed Congress' rationale for
granting national banks this power and found the statute's
purpose "was to give small town banks, which had difficulty in
deriving a sufficient profit from banking, an additional source of
revenue." 7 It also noted, "Congress thus did not indicate that
the sale of insurance in small towns was part of 'banking'....,.
Finally, the court expressed the view that this limited authority
should not be expanded through the holding company route to
form a base for general bank holding company activity:
No one doubts that subsidiaries of holding
companies which are national banks located in
small towns have the authority to broker
insurance. But to hold that other holding company
subsidiaries which are not banks have such
authority as a result of 12 U.S.C. s 92 would not
only violate the Bank Holding Company Act, but
would
warp
the
Congressional 78 intention
underlying the 1916 enactment as well.

70.

1971 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. Table 4.

71.
Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated in part, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977).
72.
See id. at 243-44 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1970)).
73.
Id. at 243 (discussing 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (a)(9)(iii) (1976)).
74.
See id. at 243-44.
75.
See id. at 243 (noting Congress had permitted since 1916 such activity for
national banks).
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.
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The principle that "banking" includes all activities of the
National Bank Act could potentially be derived from Securities
Industry Association v. Comptroller of the Currency ("SIA").79
Although this case did not concern the Bank Holding Company
Act, the court did hold that national banks had the power to act
as an agent in the sale of securities by virtue of the GlassSteagall amendment to the National Bank Act.8"
Can one
consider this activity to be in the general business of banking
upon which a "closely related to banking" decision could be made,
or must it first be established that banks generally do conduct
the particular activity?
In another case decided during the same period, the Board8'
and ultimately the Supreme Court,82 decided that the brokerage
business was "closely related" to banking and, consequently,
permissible for bank affiliates within a holding company system,
without going through the drill of establishing how many banks
engaged in the activity. That is, the Board and the Supreme
Court seemed to decide implicitly, perhaps assume, a finding that
banks "generally" engage in the activity might not be necessary
when that activity was authorized for national banks.
The Supreme Court, however, in the course of affirming the
Board's opinion that securities brokerage was "closely related" to
banking, observed:
The Board found that banks currently offer, as an
accommodation to their customers, brokerage
services that are virtually identical to the services
offered by Schwab .... Moreover, the Board cited a
1977 study by the Securities and Exchange
Commission that found that 'bank trust
department trading desks, at least at the largest
banks, perform the same functions, utilize the
same execution techniques, employ personnel with
the same general training and expertise, and use
the same facilities ... that brokers do.' Finally,
the Board concluded that the use by banks of
79.
577 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Cir. 1983), affd, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). Likewise, the Board would have no power over
the activity if it were offered by a non-affiliated bank with no connection to the Bank
Holding Company Act.
80.
See id. at 257.
81.
See BankAmerica Corp., 69 FED. RESERVE BULL. 105, 107-09 (1983).
82.
See Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 221 (1984) (affirming
the decision of the Board).
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'sophisticated techniques and resources' to execute
purchase and sell orders for the account of their
customers was sufficiently widespread to justify a
finding that banks generally are equipped to offer
the type of retail brokerage services provided by
Schwab.8 3
In other words, although the Court did not say that it was
specifically investigating whether the service was "generally"
offered, it discovered it was offered and observed that it was
offered by banks with some degree of consequence and in some
depth.84
One would expect that there exists a fairly broad set of
activities offered by some banks, but not by banks generally, and
that such activities would not constitute "banking" for purposes
of the "closely related" test. A logical place to look for such
activities is in the state bank system where, because banking
authority is granted by the separate states, one can easily
conceive of activities conducted by banks in only one or a few
states. If this situation existed, however, it was most likely
before 1991.
In the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), Congress generally
prohibited insured state banks from engaging in activities as
principals that were not allowed for national banks. 85 The actual
situation is, however, less clear. During the time the FDICIA
became effective, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
published a list of various activities that, despite being
prohibited to national banks, were nonetheless engaged in by
state banks. 8' Furthermore, the FDICIA authorizes the FDIC to
permit such activities if it finds that "the activity would pose no
significant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund." 87 To
the extent that state banks can engage in activities prohibited to
national banks, to what extent would those activities be
considered "banking" under the Bank Holding Company Act?

83.
Id. at 211-12.
84.
Id.
85.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"),
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236, 2349-53 (1991). One of the authors has
written elsewhere that, in taking this opportunity for independent action away from state
banks, Congress effectively ended the dual banking system. See CARL FELSENFELD,
BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 32.3-.4 (2000).

86.
See State Powers: FDIC Maps Exceptions to FDICIA Restrictions on State Bank
Powers, 12 No. 3 BANKING POL'Y REP. 12, 12 (Feb. 1993) (listing various activities fitting
this description).
87.
FDICIA § 303(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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A prime example of such an activity might be the general
insurance agency business. Other than under 12 U.S.C. Section
92,88 this activity is prohibited to national banks. One might
expect to find a broad scattering of authorizations to state banks
before the passage of FDICIA, and even subsequent to FDICIA,
because this legislation affects only those state bank activities
conducted by a state bank acting as principal and not as an
agent. 89 The issue was, however, never joined because from the
start, in 1971, insurance agency activities for bank holding
companies were carefully structured to relate to a credit offering
by the related bank or holding company.9" These provisions were
generally looked to as setting the appropriate area and the
standard for the bank holding companies, rather than the
activities of the banking system at large.9 ' It is difficult to
identify any activity outside insurance, after 1971, that might
have been offered widely by state banks but was prohibited to
national banks and might, thereby, have set a test for a
definition of "banking."
Another speculation about the definition of "banking" relates
to core banking functions. In Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n,
the Supreme Court held that to constitute a national bank
branch, a "core banking function" had to be involved, and the
Court further held that the brokerage business, at issue in the
case, did not rise to that level. 92 One wonders whether it is
sensible to conclude that the brokerage business can constitute
the general business of banking9 3 while at the same time holding
that the location at which the business is conducted causes the
bank to not be a bank branch. The Clarke case was, however,
decided after the SIA case and was not concerned with whether
an activity was "closely related" to banking or, for that matter,
whether it was generally engaged in by banks.
In sum, it is probably fair to say that, in reality, any activity
found permissible for a national bank will probably be deemed
88.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (allowing national banks in places with a population not
exceeding five thousand to act as an insurance agent or broker).
89.
FDICIA § 303(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
90.
See Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under the
Bank Holding Company Act-A Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33 CATH. U. L. REV.
163, 167-68 (1983) (noting that, in order to be permissible, the Board only required
insurance be sold by the bank holding company in a manner bearing a direct relationship
to the extension of credit by bank or bank related holding company affiliates).
91.
The system was overhauled by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, P.L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
92.
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 404, 409 (1987).
93.
See Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 211, 214-15 (1984).
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"generally" engaged in by banks because of the number of
national banks subject to the same authorizing statute. The
question of whether a branch is involved must simply be seen as
a separate issue and not dependent upon interpretations of the
Bank Holding Company Act.
The Supreme Court observed in the SIA case "that Congress
vested the Board with considerable discretion to consider and
weigh a variety of factors in determining whether an activity is
'closely related' to banking."9 4 Clearly, that discretion applies to
the "closely related" aspect of the test. Whether the Board's
discretion applies to the concept of "banking" itself, and how the
Supreme Court regards this issue, is less clear.
This second concept of banking has lost virtually all of its
significance since the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. GLB
authorizes two types of bank holding companies. The first is the
traditional bank holding company originally authorized under
the 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act.95 If
the holding company continues after passage of GLB in 1999, the
activities that the bank-affiliated companies may conduct are
those that were deemed acceptable by the Board one day before
the effective date of GLB.9"
While those activities were
established based upon whether they were "closely related to
banking," and while, for that purpose, banking was a significant
factor, they were fully determined by the time of GLB.97 Thus,
the meaning of "banking" for that purpose no longer has any
particular impact. The reduction of restrictions upon what
holding companies may do showcases a pattern for operation of
the Bank Holding Company Act.
We will see a constant
reduction in those restrictions from the 1956 enactment date of
the Bank Holding Company Act through the 1970 Amendments
and GLB to the present and an indication that the restrictions
will continue to lessen in the future, harbinging a new age of
banking.

94.
Id. at 214; see also Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control,
65 Fed. Reg. 80,384, 80,385 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (stating
"[t]he Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act broadened.., the authority of the Board to determine the
scope of activities permissible for [holding companies]").
95.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2000) (defining "bank holding company").
96.
GLB § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000).
97.
However, section 103 of GLB does permit the Board to modify those
determinations. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000).
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"PROPER

Activities that are "closely related" to and a "proper incident"
to banking is the second of the five major categories into which
the Bank Holding Company Act now divides all commercial
activities.98 This category came into existence with the 1970
Amendments to the Act and was part of a two-fold legislative
objective: (1) to include all bank holding companies under the Act
(particularly the one-bank holding companies that had previously
been excluded from coverage), and (2) to expand the type of
activity in which affiliates of a bank inside a holding company
could engage.9 9
As a result of GLB, this group of activities has become the
least important of the five divisions. Essentially, it is frozen in
place as of November 11, 1999,1"' for companies that do not move
forward under GLB and become financial holding companies.
The Board approvals granted as of that date remain in place,
unchanged, "subject to such terms and conditions contained in
such regulation or order, unless modified by the Board."'' This
does not freeze the particular activities of a given bank holding
company; it means that new activities for that company must be
activities previously approved, even if not approved for that bank
holding company.
As already observed, one-bank holding
companies were not covered by the pre-1970 Act. 10 2 As a result,
they could engage in any activity permitted by their general
corporate (and, of course, bank) charters despite the fact they
were affiliated with banks inside a holding company.' 3 No
regulatory approval was required and their activities ranged

98.
See BHCA § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000).
99.
See S. REP. NO. 91-1084 (1970) (stating that the purpose of the amendments
was to bring companies controlling one bank, we well as more than one, under control of
the Act, but to allow flexibility in the range of permissible activities).
100.
November 11, 1999 was one day before enactment of the GLB. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k)(4)(G) (2000).
101.
Id. An example of the Board modifying a previous order occurred in its action
on December 21, 2000, which it expanded "from 30 to 49 percent the amount of revenues
that may be derived from nonfinancial data processing," with the data processing still
considered to be "closely related to banking." Bank Holding Companies and Change in
Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384, 80,385 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 225).
102.
See BHCA § 2(a), 70 Stat. at 133 (1956).
103.
Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for
Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING L.J. 446, 454 (1998) (explaining how the pre1970 Act lead banks to reorganize into one-bank holding companies so they could escape
regulation).
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across the spectrum of business activities.'
On the other hand,
affiliates of banks in multi-bank holding companies were tightly
restrained by the Act and essentially could engage only in
activities permitted to their affiliated banks.'
The 1970 Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments sought a middle ground
between these two extremes. One-bank holding companies would
be covered; at the same time, all affiliates of banks would be
permitted to engage in a wider range of businesses, provided they
were "closely related" to banking and a "proper incident"
thereto. 106
This new test appeared in the famous Section 4(c)(8) and
was significant enough to become a word in the banking
vocabulary - forseeate. 0 7 The test reads as follows: "activities of
which had been determined by the Board by regulation or order
... to be so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident
thereto."' °8
A significant element of the test, one still a part of bank
holding company law, is the clear exclusion from activities that
could be performed inside a bank holding company of activities of
a non-financial nature. 109 For example, a bank affiliate could not
manufacture cars or sell hamburgers. In 1970, a separation was
established between banking and "commerce" as it is commonly
called."0 This separation quickly became a foundation of the Act
and an accepted principle of banking law. The Federal Reserve
System and its charismatic Chairman at the time, Arthur Burns,
successfully conveyed this ideology of separation."' Regardless of
the demonstrable fact that banks had been deeply involved in
"commerce," by owning canals, supplying water, steam, gas and
112
light, operating turnpikes and in other early enterprises,
104.
See Carter H. Golembe, From Saxon to Ludwig: The National Bank Charterin a
ChangingEnvironment, 17 BANKING POL'Y REPORT, Apr. 20, 1998, at 1.
105.
See BHCA § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135-37.
106.
See GLB §§ 101, 103, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a), 1843 (2000).
107.
1970 Amendments § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000).
108.
§1843(c)(8) (setting forth the famous 4(c)(8) test).
The Act lists other
permissible activities for bank affiliates, but by far the most significant are those passing
the 4(c)(8) test.
109.
§1843(c)(8); Alan E. Sorcher & Satish M. Kini, Does the Term "Bank BrokerDealer"Still Have Meaning, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 227, 242 (2002) (noting the continuing
distinction between banking and commercial activities).
110.
1970 Amendments § 103.
111.
See Carter H. Golembe, Separation of Banking and Commerce: A Myth That's
Ripe for Debate, 16 No. 2 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 16 (1997); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the
FederalReserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 867 (1989).
112.
See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has it Lived its Life?, 38
VILL. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1993); see generally Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American
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Congress had never seriously questioned this principle. In
balancing the competing risks, whatever additional risk the
prohibition of the reasonable diversification of its activities
imposed on the banking system was outweighed by the danger of
bank entry into commerce.
Therefore, banks have been
prevented from taking the most fundamental investment advice,
diversifying your risk, and engage in lending money, the riskiest
activity of all for banks.
The 4(c)(8) test is composed of two components, which
require separate consideration. The first component is whether
the activity is closely related to banking, and the second
component is whether it is a proper incident to banking. 113 As to
the first, National CourierAss'n v. Board of Governors attempted
to decipher the legislative intention and observed the following
possibilities: "Is it an intentionally vague phrase by which
Congress very largely left it up to the Board to decide what kinds
and degrees of relationships are sufficiently close? Or is there
some more specific connection that the Board must find exists
between banking and the assertedly related activity?"" 4 The
Nat'l Courtier Ass'n court refined the definition of closely related
and interpreted it to mean that an activity is closely related to
banking if:
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the
proposed services.
2. Banks generally provide services that are
operationally or functionally so similar to the
proposed services as to equip them particularly
well to provide the proposed service.
3. Banks generally provide services that are so
integrally related to the proposed services as to
require their provision in a specialized form. 15

Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 1011 (2001) (discussing early American banking and commerce); Edward L.
Symons, Jr., The Business of Banking in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 676, 687-88 (1983).
113.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
114.
Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors., 516 F.2d 1229, 1236 (1975). The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals examined the development of the 1970 change and
concluded greater flexibility for banking activities beyond the pre-1970 law was intended.
Id. at 1236.
115.
Id. at 1237.
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Determinations of whether a certain activity was closely
related to banking did not generally present difficulties to the
Fed. Indeed, one noted commentator in the banking field wrote
that the Fed's analysis only entailed whether banks performed
the activity, and whether
the activity was "closely related," or
116
was not part of the test.
In the early years under the 1970 Amendments, the Federal
Reserve Board acted conservatively in the administration of its
new powers. Activities were approved as closely related to
banking with care and circumspection. Bank holding companies
planning to expand into their new powers discovered
immediately that Board concerns, justified or not, had to be
satisfied before a new activity was approved. 1 7 This regulatory
attitude is reflective of the usual position not only of the
regulators, but also of Congress in dealing with banks: restriction
and prohibition. Concerns with risk have always dominated
possibilities of advancement in powers.
As a result, this
precautionary approach was ultimately proven unnecessary and
the Board, in recognizing its needless paranoia, nearly went to
the other extreme.
Insurance, as a holding company affiliate activity,
represents a separate legal thread from the 1970 Amendments to
GLB in 1999.118 Upon the 1970 changes and the introduction of
"closely related to banking" and "a proper incident thereto"
requirements, insurance first took its place with all other nonbanking activity."9 Specifically, insofar as the holding company
was concerned, it had to pass the 4(c)(8) tests in order to be
allowed. Given the interest of banks and their affiliates in
offering insurance on the one hand and the entrenched position
of the national independent insurance agents on the other, fierce
contests ensued over the legitimacy of insurance for bank holding
companies after 1970.120
The Court of Appeals decision in
Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors
exemplifies the conflict during this time period.' 2' The case
116.

Peter Wallison, Reader's Turn, 2000-9 GOLEMBE REPORTS 5.

117.
See generally Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
118.
See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After GrammLeach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 709-10 (2000) (discussing the distinct character of
insurance).
119.
Lisa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance:Before and After
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 746 (2000).
120.
Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 230-31 (5th Cir.
1976).
121.
See Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir.
1976), vacated in part by 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977) (claiming the case at hand
represents numerous other episodes in the battle between the bank holding company
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examined Federal Reserve regulations and whether the
insurance activities two bankholding companies engaged in
satisfied the 1970 statutory test. 122 The Court held that a portion
3
12
of the insurance activities were "closely related" to banking;
and that some were a "proper incident thereto."2 4 In hindsight,
one is surprised by the Court's antique arguments on these
points and the fine distinctions it created. Given the broad
"financially related" activities the GLB created in 1999, it is hard
not to question the Alabama Ass'n decision.
In 1982, as part of the Garn-St.Germain Depository
Institutions Act ("Garn-St. Germain"), Congress drastically
changed the relationship between insurance and bank holding
companies. 125 Garn-St. Germain provided: "[lit is not closely
related to banking.., for a bank holding company to provide
insurance as a principal, agent, or broker ...."
Before Garn-St. Germain, bank holding companies had
offered insurance both as principal and as an agent in a variety
of forms. 2 7 Garn-St. Germain was a major victory for the
independent agents and a defeat for the banks. However, the
banks still had enough legislative influence to recover a generous
piece of potentially lost ground. This influence is evidenced by
the number of exceptions from Congress' new test engrafted onto
the statute. 128 For example, the ban did not apply to the following
activities:
1. acting in connection with credit life or credit
accident and health insurance;
2. acting as an agent for physical damage
insurance covering collateral used to secure
loans made by finance company nonbank
affiliates in a bank holding company system
where the amount financed is at least $10,000
industry and the insurance industry).
122.
Id. at 242-44 (explaining that courier services and brokering of convenience
insurance are not incidental to banking, but property damage insurance sales are an
activity which is incident to banking).
123.
Id. at 241-42, 244 (approving physical damage insurance on collateral taken for
bank loans and disallowing insurance offered as a matter of convenience).
124.
Id. at 245-246.
125.
See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St. Germain"),
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
126.
Garn-St. Germain § 601.
127.
Barry A. Abbott et al., Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus. LAW. 1005,
1006-07(1988).
128. Garn-St. Germain § 601.
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(except that the ceiling is $25,000 where
manufactured or mobile homes are the
collateral);
3. insurance offered in communities of 5,000 or
less, or where it can be demonstrated that
there are inadequate insurance facilities;
4. certain not insubstantial grandfather rights
were granted to companies already offering
insurance
under
the
Fed's
existing
authorizations; or
5. insurance offerings in small (under $50 million)
bank holding companies. 121
In summary, while many activities continued to be allowed,
others were no longer "closely related to banking" and were,
therefore, no longer permissible.
A new chapter arrived with GLB in 2000.13° As described in
greater detail in the next subdivision, GLB has authorized the
newly formed financial services holding company to engage in
both insuring as a principal and acting as an agent or broker. 3'
This exercise particularly highlighted how politicized the
insurance conflict had become. One is at a loss to explain how it
can be "closely related to banking" for insurance to be written on
a $9,000 loan, but not "closely related" on an $11,000 loan. It
appears, in this area, words mean whatever Congress wants
them to mean.
Perhaps the greatest problem that arose concerning the
power of bank affiliates in a holding company structure relates to
the underwriting of securities. 3 2 While bank holding companies
were actively trying to get power to underwrite and the Board

129.
Garn-St. Germain § 601.
130.
Some vestiges remained with the bank holding companies that did not become
financial holding companies as they are forced to follow bank holding company law as it
was "as of the day before the date of the enactment .
GLB § 102(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (2000).
131.
See GLB §103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B).
132.
In general, banks themselves could not underwrite corporate securities.
National banks were prohibited under the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2000).
State banks were, after 1992, prohibited due to section 24 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act as amended by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, which restricted state banks to act as principals only in such
activities as were authorized to national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
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was rejecting their applications, the source of the problem was
not the Bank Holding Company Act and §4(c)(8). Instead, the
prohibitions contained in the Glass-Steagall Act created the
problems.'33 The underwriting of securities was easily held to be
"closely related" to banking.'
The new liberalized approach of the 1970 Amendments
found its expression in the 1997 Regulatory amendments.'3 5 In
many ways, the Board streamlined the process of determining
whether an activity was "closely related" to banking.
It
summarized its objectives in the Summary to the 1996 Proposed
Rules:
The Board is proposing a comprehensive
amendment of Regulation Y that is intended to
improve the competitiveness of bank holding
companies by eliminating unnecessary regulatory
burden and operating restrictions, and by
streamlining
the
application/notice
process.
Among other proposed revisions, the Board
proposes to establish a streamlined and expedited
review process for bank and nonbanking proposals
by well-run bank holding companies. The Board
also proposes to reorganize and expand the
regulatory list of nonbanking activities and to
remove a number of restrictions on those activities
that are outmoded, have been superseded by Board
order or do not apply to
insured banks that
36
activity.
same
the
conduct
For the first time, the Board seems to have placed bank
competitiveness ahead of fears for bank safety. Applications for
"closely-related-to-banking" status could now be made in "an
expedited and nearly red-tape free approval process" for bank
holding companies that meet certain basic prudential standards,
supported by only "a simple, short letter and only 15 days
advance notice." 37 The Board was seeking to permit approvals
133.
12 U.S.C. § 378 (2000).
134.
J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473, 487 (1987) (rationalizing
because banks provide services similar to securities underwriting, they are "well equipped
to provide such services").
135.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 62 Fed.
Reg. 9,290 (Feb. 28, 1997), (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1997)).
136.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 61 Fed.
Reg. 47242 (proposed Sep. 6, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
137.
Id. at 47242-43.
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"to the fullest extent permissible under the [Bank Holding
Company] Act"'38 and to make approvals virtually automatic
leaving the discovery of potential (or even real) problems not to
the application process, but to the regular course of regulatory
investigation and supervision."'
For bank holding companies satisfying the basic
standards, 4 ' simplified application procedures were made
available in 1997 and are currently available as well. Replies4
from the Board are normally due within twelve business days.' '
This entire process of expanded permissiveness and simplified
procedures leads naturally into the Gramm-Leach-Bliley period,
which we will comment upon in the next sub-chapter. For now, it
is sufficient to observe that the more receptive Board attitude
continues to dominate.
On the second factor of the test, that the activity be a
"proper incident to banking," the Act provides useful
interpretation. It provides:
In connection with a notice under this subsection,
the Board shall consider whether performance of
the activity by a bank holding company or a
subsidiary of such company can reasonably be
expected to produce benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or
gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse
effects, such as undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition, conflicts
of
42
practices.
banking
unsound
or
interests,
Following the 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the National
CourierAssociation case established that the "closely related to
banking" test and the "proper incident" test as two separate legal
tests requiring separate consideration:
The parties are agreed that there are two distinct
issues raised by a bank holding company's seeking

138.
Id. at 47243.
139.
We are not aware of any Board action modifying any permission previously
given.
140.
12 C.F.R. § 225.23(b)-(c) (setting forth the guidelines for the expedited
procedure).
141.
12 C.F.R. § 225.23(b).
142.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2) (2000).
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to hold shares in a company engaged in nonbanking activities ....
The first is whether those
activities are "closely related to banking."... The
second or so-called "public benefits" issue, derived
from the 1970 amendments to the Act, is one
which normally must be resolved upon specific
facts. 143
The first issue is normally thought of as the more crucial, while
the second issue is often perceived as largely passed over because
of a belief that anything new or additional almost necessarily
confers public benefits as a new development. However, the
public benefits test has had a scattered and occasionally
significant presence in Federal Reserve decisions.
One
commentator wrote:
[TIhe public benefits test gave the Board enormous
power to define the scope of permissible bank
holding company activities. The Board wielded
this power liberally, imposing any number of
conditions and restrictions designed to conform
bank holding company activities to the Board's
notion of what was appropriate. The test enabled
the Board to address every conceivable regulatory
concern
from
customer
confusion
to the
commingling of banking and commerce to tying
and other antitrust issues. 144
Whether the "proper incidents" test was this strong a factor
between the 1970 amendments that brought it into existence and
the 1999 amendments that largely eliminated it 1 45 is subject to
dispute. Undoubtedly, it was a strong weapon in the Board's
hands. It was, however, rarely used to deny an acquisition.
There was continuing discussion in Board decisions14 dealing
with the requirement in the years following 1970. Over the last
143.
Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors 516 F.2d 1229, 1232-33.
144.
Pauline B. Heller & Melanie L. Fein, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW
§ 4.04[2] (2002).
145.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (showing the few remaining portions of the proper incident
consideration that the GLB tests failed to eliminate).
146.
See BTNB Corp., 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. 70, 71 (1972); see also U.S. Bancorp,
58 FED. RESERVE BULL. 177, 178 (1972); First Tulsa Bancorporation, Inc., 58 FED.

RESERVE BULL. 317, 318 (1972). See Nortrust Corp., 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. 67, 68
(1972); see also First Bank Sys., Inc., 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. 172, 174 (1972); see also
First Chicago Corp., 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. 175, 176 (1972).
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decade, with little variation,'47 it was mentioned only to indicate
that its tests were satisfied. This was a result of numerous
causes, including infusions of new capital that could be relied
upon to bring public benefits,'4 8 the acquisition of new systems, 49
new cash investments resulting in consumer benefits, 5 °
convenience and needs factors meetings, 5 ' and improvements in
customer service. 152
Bank holding companies had long wanted to acquire thrift
institutions, including S&Ls. These types of institutions were set
out in the Bank Holding Company Act as an exception to the
definition of banks, 151 thus they had to be acquired under the
provisions of Section 4(c)(8). This means that for a bank holding
company to acquire a thrift institution, the Board had to find
them as both "closely related" to banking and a "proper incident"
to banking. The first test did not pose a particular problem in
order to be satisfied. S&Ls had such similar characteristics to
banks as to be virtually indistinguishable.
Among other
functions, both took deposits and made loans. However, under
the second test, the Board found no public benefit in bank
holding companies absorbing them.
In becoming closely
associated with commercial banks, S&Ls would be removed from
the special market niche in which the law had positioned them
and the public might lose that benefit. The Board therefore
denied their approval under the public benefits test,54 at least
until a public benefit presented itself in 1982 with the great S&L
financial crisis. The public benefit was that a bank holding
company, in acquiring a floundering S&L, could save the S&L
from dissolution. 155 In the GLB revisions of 1999, the "proper
incident" test was discarded entirely. 15 For twenty-nine years,
the combination of "closely-related-to-banking" and "properincident-to-banking" test was the basic door to allowing a
company in a bank holding company system to engage in an
activity other than banking itself. The prior combination of tests
147.

Metro Armored

Courier, Inc.,

79 FED. RESERVE BULL.

352, 354-55 (1993)

(demonstrating a situation in which an armored car service was seen to undermine a
company's financial condition with little attendant benefit).
148.

Banc One Corp., 81 FED. RESERVE BULL. 492, 498 (1995).

149.
Norwest Corp., 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. 683, 684 (1996).
150.
Money Stations, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 81 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir.
1996), vacated by 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting the Board's statement).
151.

Chem. Banking Corp., 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. 239, 257 (1996) (reviewing the

convenience and needs factors under the banking statutes).
152.
Travelers Group, Inc., 84 FED. RESERVE BULL. 985, 1008 (1998).
153.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(B) (2000).
154.
See, e.g., D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 FED. RESERVE BULL. 280, 283 (1977).
155.
See Interstate Financial Corp., 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 316, 316-318 (1982).
156.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3) (2000).
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was replaced in GLB by a new and broader test applicable to
bank holding companies that achieved "financial holding
company" status.'5 7 However, for those that did not attain that
status, whether by choice or necessity, the 4(c) (8) determinations
as they existed "as of the day before [the date of the enactment of
GLB]" would continue in effect.'58 Thus, while the concepts of
banking, of "closely related" to banking, and of a "proper
incident" to banking all remained of some significance as
divisions under the Bank Holding Company Act, they no longer
held the crucial places they had previously occupied. The basic
test for a bank holding company activity under the GLB Act,
financially related, was clearly broader and subject to less
technicalities.
As discussed infra, the new test reflected a
continued reduction in anxiety on behalf of the Board and an
advancement by banks and their affiliates into the new world of
banking.
IV.

ACTIVITIES "FINANCIAL IN NATURE"

The term "financial in nature," a new segment of assets the
GLB crafted in 1999, had been used before the enactment of GLB
by the U.S. regulatory agencies as well as by courts to define
various financial products and services.'59 One example is in the
delineation of activities that bank holding company non-bank
affiliates could engage in before the 1970 Amendments.
Activities were allowed if they were "of a financial, fiduciary, or
insurance nature and which the Board after due notice and
hearing, and on the basis of the record made at such hearing, by
order has determined to be so closely related to the business of
banking... ,," The test was broadened in 1970 to include
"activities of which had been determined by the Board ...to be
so closely related to banking.... ""' In Alabama Ass'n of
Insurance Agents v. the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, the court construed the elimination of the "financial"
requirement as indicative of "a modest broadening of the Board's
discretion."' 2
157.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000).
158.
GLB § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000) (showing that the rigidity of this test
was modified in GLB with the addition of the words "unless modified by the Board").
159.
See Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 865 F.2d
320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
160.
BHCA § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (showing original Bank Holding Co. Act
language prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 91-607 (1970)).
161.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). See also Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat.
236, 238 (setting forth BHCA prior to the broadening of the test applied to interests in
non-banking organizations).
162.
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir.
1976).
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Prior to the GLB, the wording "financial in nature," as
defining the Board's discretion with respect to holding company
activities, never had a unique or clear meaning. Since the
Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents case, changes have occurred
in the banking industry. The enactment of GLB, in particular,
was an attempt to define not only the concept of "financial in
nature" activities, but to establish the legal structure for the
creation of the "new" form of BHC, the financial holding
companies ("FHC").
In addition, GLB established a new
regulatory power to be shared between the Board and the
Treasury through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC").163

Under GLB, 1 4 a BHC may elect to become a FHC and
thereby engage, directly or through a nonbank subsidiary, in any
activity that is "financial in nature." 6 5 Unless it elects to become
an FHC, a BHC is limited to activities the Act and other relevant
banking acts already permit. 66 GLB specified the major banking
activities that are "financial in nature." 7
Subject to the
concurrence of the Department of the Treasury (as a practical
matter, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency within the
Treasury), the Board is permitted to authorize by regulation or
order activities other than the ones
already so defined that it
6 8
nature."
in
"financial
be
to
deems
GLB requires that in order to become a FHC, the electing
BHC must certify that its depository institution subsidiaries are
"well-capitalized" and "well-managed," and that they have at
163.
See Michael P. Malloy, Banking in the Twenty-First Century, 25 J. CORP. L. 787,
820 (2000).
164.
Signed into law by President Clinton on November 12, 1999, GLB represents
the culmination of Congressional financial reform efforts spanning more than twenty
years.
Charles M. Horn & Brian W. Smith, Financial Modernization in the New
Millennium: Implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 116 BANKING L.J. 689, 689
(1999).
GLB made sweeping changes to federal statutes governing the scope of
permissible activities and the supervision of banks, bank holding companies, and their
affiliates. In particular, GLB substantially lowers, but does not eliminate, the barriers
the Banking Act of 1933 erected between the banking and securities industries and the
1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act erected between the banking and the
insurance industries. Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Recent Legislation: Financial
Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 579 (2000). GLB transformed federal banking
legislation dating back to the Great Depression. Gary Silverman, Level Playing Field
Still Elusive: US Regulation,FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at 4.
165.
See Michael P. Malloy, International Financial Services: An Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 55, 57 (2002).
166.
See Sarah A. Miller, Financial Modernization: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Summary, 1 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING EDUC. 53, 63 (2000).
167.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4).
168.
GLB §103, 12 U.S.C. §1843(k)(2).
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least a "satisfactory" Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")
rating.'
The Board has promulgated regulations defining the
concepts of "well-capitalized" and "well-managed."
"Wellcapitalized" is defined in terms of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation concept of appropriate capital.'
Essentially, this
concept means that the bank must have a Tier One capital of at
least six percent, and a total capital of at least ten percent of its
risk adjusted assets under the Basel formula, and also meet the
leverage test of three percent Tier One capital to total assets. 7 '
The Board's definition of "well-managed" 17 2 requires the bank
have had at least "satisfactory" composite rating at its most
recent examination from the Board."'
FHC election becomes
effective on the 31st day after the company files a notice with the
Board, but the Board can accelerate it.'74
If an FHC falls out of compliance with the "well-capitalized"
or "well-managed" requirements, it will have a six-month period
to cure the violation.7 5 Otherwise, it will be forced to divest
either its bank subsidiaries or its new financial activities.'
Also,
if a subsidiary bank falls out of compliance with the CRA
requirement, the FHC will be barred from making any
acquisitions or commencing new activities.
The scope of activities permitted to FHCs as "financial in
nature" is meant to be broader 178 than the scope of activities
169.
GLB § 103(a), 112 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4).
170.
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r) (2001).
171.
See Stacie E. McGinn, After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-A Road Map for
Insurance Companies, Impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on the Insurance Industry at
113, 121 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 130-OOQU, 2000).
172.
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s).
173.
See William J. Sweet, Jr., After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-A Road Map for
Banks, Securities Firms and Investment Managers:Interim Rules, Final OCC Rules and
Proposed Rules Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-A
Road Map for Insurance Companies at 219, 357 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 130-00QT, 2000).
174.
See Horn & Smith, supra note 164, at 692.
175.
12 U.S.C. § 24a(e)(4) (2000).
176.
Id.
177.
David L. Glass, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Overview of the Key Provisions;
PresentationBefore the State of New York Banking Department, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 8 (2000).
178.
According to Laurence H. Meyer, member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, "[o]ne thing that is clear is that Congress intended the 'financial
in nature' test to be broader than the previous test for authorizing new activities for bank
holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act." Laurence H. Meyer, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Before H.R. Subcomm. on
Fin. Instit. and Consumer Credit, Comm. on Fin. Serv., (May 2, 2001), in 87 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 445 (2001); see also Testimony of Federal Reserve Officers, 87 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 445, 445 (2001) (testimony of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System, before the House Committee on Financial Services,
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permitted to BHCs under the pre-1999 BHC ("so closely related
to banking... as to be a proper incident thereto"). However,
activities that are interpreted as "financial in nature" seem to be
virtually identical with those previously defined as "closely
related to banking." The new test must, however, be regarded in
terms of its potential as well as its actual degree of expansion.
Although the "financial in nature" test may now represent only a
slight expansion beyond "closely related to banking," such
expansion could potentially introduce a whole new age of
activities particularly in newly-developing areas like internet
banking that are likely to play a major role in the banking
industry's near future."' This potential for growth may give GLB
its most significant effect upon the banking industry Where GLB
has expanded BHC activities, it was not the result of the "new"
financial activity test, but rather by adding the following
activities to the BHC permissible list. These activities, although
largely "closely related" to banking under the pre-GLB test, had
been prohibited to BHCs until GLB permitted them through the
operation of specific statutes.
One activity GLB added was securities activities,
particularly underwriting and dealing in securities.
GLB
repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 180 which
prohibited BHCs from conducting such and also specifically noted
those activities to be "financial in nature." A second activity GLB
focused on was insurance activities, as principal or agent, when
the insurance indemnifies against loss, harm, damage, illness,
disability or death. 18 ' GLB, 182 by amending the Act section 4(c)(8),

May 2, 2001) (outlining the GLB framework and discussing "the joint proposal by the
Board and the Secretary of Treasury relating to real estate brokerage and management").
179.
Globalization of economy is bringing the need for banks to harmonize and
expend their banking activity powers. Joseph J. Norton, A "New InternationalFinancial
Architecture?" - Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension, 33 INT'L LAW. 891, 898
(1999) (recounting the drastic change the last decade has witnessed in traditional banks).
On the one hand, the U.S. banking system has traditionally maintained a conservative
view in terms of expansion of banking activity powers. Heidi Mandanis Schooner,
Popular Images of Bankers Reflected in Regulation, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 31 (2001). On
the other hand, considering the globalization of the economy and the increase of a
worldwide competitive market in the banking and finance sectors, U.S. banking has been
overcoming such challenges by gradually opening and relaxing the bank activity powers,
which will make banks more efficient and productive. See generally Jerry W. Markham,
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 253 (2000).
180.
The Glass-Steagall Act specified banks may not be affiliated with any company
"engaged principally" in underwriting securities. Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377
(2000). Prohibition against directs and management personnel between a bank and a
company "primarily engaged" in underwriting securities. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
181.
GLB § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 6715 (2000) (preempting state laws forbidding or
restricting affiliation of an insurer with a depository institution).
182.
GLB § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
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provides that insurance activity is "closely related to banking."'83
GLB also made merchant banking a financially related activity.
Merchant banking is described in part as ownership of any
company "as a part of a bona fide underwriting or merchant or
investment banking activity, including investment activities
engaged in for the purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale."'84
Because merchant banking is such an important part of many
securities firms' business, a securities firm would be deterred
from affiliating with a bank if the firm were required to divest its
merchant banking activity."'85
GLB also explicitly included within the term "financial in
nature" what the Board had previously deemed "to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto." 86 It simultaneously listed a series of
such activities including lending and investing for others,
providing financial investment or economic advisory services,
and financial data processing services. 187 Financial activities also
include those previously prescribed by the Board as permitted in
connection with banking overseas."'
These activities would
include those "that the Board determines are usual in connection
with the transaction of the business of banking in the places
where the ... bank's branches transact business."'89 Most banks
would not divest their traditional banking capabilities to affiliate
with a securities firm. GLB aimed to establish a 'two-way
street'... designed to enable securities firms and banks to
affiliate freely with each other and to ensure that securities
firms, once they become partners with banks, are not artificially
restricted in their activities."190
The BHC Act has permitted BHCs to hold no more than five
percent of the stock of any non-financial activity.' 9' The new socalled "merchant banking" activities 192 permits FHCs to acquire
full ownership in any type of non-financial entity so long as the
acquisition is essentially for "the purpose of appreciation and
183.
See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 FED. REG.
14,433, 14,435 (March 17, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
184.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
185.
Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the House Comm. on Capital
Markets, Sec., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises,106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Marc. E.
Lackritz, President, Securities Industries Association), http://www.sia.com/testimony/
html/marc testimony 6-7.html.
186.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F).
187.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4).
188.
Id.
189.
12 C.F.R. § 211.4(b) (2002).
190.
Testimony of Mark E. Lackritz, supra note 185.
191.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)-(7) (2000).
192.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C.§ 1843(k)(7).
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ultimate resale or disposition of the investment."'9 3
This
underlying purpose ensures the activity is truly "financial in
nature" and not primarily to enter into the particular business
being acquired. Thus, while the merchant banking activity
appears to represent a major exception to the policy of the BHC
Act, to separate banking and commerce it is at least a financial,
not a commercial, activity.
The Board has stated in one
published report that the merchant banking authority "contains
provisions that are designed to help maintain the separation
between banking and commerce. ... ""' These provisions include
limits on the amount of time that a merchant banking
investment may be held and the circumstances under which the
FHC may routinely manage or operate an acquired, called a
"portfolio," company."'
GLB authorizes the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury
to issue such joint regulations implementing the merchant
banking authority as the two agencies "jointly deem appropriate
to assure compliance with the purposes and prevent evasions of
[the BHC Act] and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and to protect
depository institutions."9 '
The statute provides that such
regulations may impose limitations on transactions between
depository institutions and companies controlled pursuant to the
merchant banking power."'
In response to the statutory authority, the Board and the
Secretary of the Treasury jointly issued and adopted interim
regulations to implement the merchant banking authority. 198 The
regulations imposed are policies and systems to monitor and
assess risks associated with merchant banking investments, to
assure the corporate separateness of FHCs and each portfolio
company, and to limit the potential to which the FHC or its
affiliated depositary institution may be legally liable for the
financial obligations or operations of those companies.
In
addition, such rules established aggregate investment limits to
reduce the potential level of risk to a depositary institution
affiliated with an FHC.199
193.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
194.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460,
16,460 (2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 225, 1500).
195.
Id.
196.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(7)(A).
197.
Id.
198.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16,460.
199.
See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Challenges Financial
Regulators To Assure Safe Transition In Banking Industry, 72 OCT N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 38
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Prior to the enactment of GLB, securities and insurance
underwriting were considered to be activities "closely related to
banking" but were prohibited or limited in holding companies
because of the Glass-Steagall Act's treatment of securities
activities and the Garn-St. Germain Act's treatment of the
insurance business. 2°° As far as merchant banking went, banks
could enter into indirect investments in equities through private
investment groups, occasionally acting as manager of the group
at collecting performance-based fees. 2°1 Under the BHC Act,
banks also had authority to directly invest in equities through
three vehicles: Small Business Investment Companies ("SBICs"),
Edge Act corporations, and non-banking subsidiaries.
Banks
and BHCs had been authorized to operate SBICs that can invest
in up to half of the equity of an individual small business.2 3 Edge
corporations, which are mostly subsidiaries of banks, as well as,
subsidiaries of holding companies, could acquire up to twenty
percent of the voting equity and forty percent of the total equity
of non-financial companies outside the United States.0 4 Finally,
a BHC could benefit from a presumption that it was not in
control of a company if it had the power to vote less than five
percent of any class of voting securities; it conclusively did have
control, however, if it had power to vote twenty-five percent or
more of any voting class.
In a modification of its former
positions, the Board ruled that a BHC could acquire up to
twenty-five percent of the voting stock of a company if the BHC
could prove that it did not have control of the company and
another stockholder owns more shares than the BHC. °6
As a result of these expanded activities granted to FHCs, the
GLB effectively permits affiliation between BHCs, insurance
companies and securities firms under the umbrella of an FHC.
However, GLB, except in the case of merchant banking
investments, continues to prohibit affiliations between depository
institutions and companies engaged in activities that are not
(2000).
200.
See Clyde Mitchell, Financial Modernization - One Year Later!, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 19, 2001, at 3.
201.
See Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the 36th Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 4, 2000),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000504.htm.
202.
Id. (defining these three terms).
203.
Id. (currently, a small business is defined as an entity with less than USD 20
million of pre-investment capital).
204. Id.
205.
BHCA § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A), (a)(3) (2000).
206.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 80384,
80,387 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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"financial in nature."217 In particular, GLB permits an FHC to
engage in non-financial activities only if the FHC was not a BHC
prior to November 12, 1999, but became an FHC by acquiring a
depository institution after that date, and the FHC is only
permitted to retain commercial activities subject to certain
revenue limits, cross-marketing limits, and grand-fathering
restrictions set forth in GLB. 2 " As a result, if a BHC or an FHC
that was formerly a BHC is contemplating a merger with a
securities or insurance company engaged in part in "nonfinancial" activities, °9 these "non-financial" activities may be
retained only if the insurance and/or securities firm will not be
dissolved, pursuant to the BHC or FHC post-merger
organization.
BHCs that do not elect FHC status will continue to be
regulated by the Board as such, and their permissible activities
will continue be limited to those that are "closely related to
banking" and "incidental to banking" as prescribed by the BHC
Act, the Board orders and regulations in effect as of the date of
enactment of GLB.2 1 The permissible legal scope of non-electing
BHC activities was essentially frozen on November 11, 1999.211
While most of the "incidental to banking" test 21 2 has been
replaced by the new test of "financial in nature" activities under
GLB, some has been retained and applied under the BHCA as
modified by GLB. In this respect, section 4(j)(2)(A) of the BHC
Act refers to "a notice under this subsection" for BHC-s to obtain
21
the Board's approval to engage in nonbanking activities. 13 The
criteria the Board is directed to apply in considering these
notices includes consideration of whether performance of the new
activity "can ... be expected to produce benefits to the public...
that outweigh possible adverse effects ....
.214
This is the
previous incidental benefits test. There are three types of notices
a BHC may give to the Board under this subsection. Notices are
based on the BHC's request to carry out the following
nonbanking activities:
2
(i) activities "closely related to banking;

15

207.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (k)(1)(A) (2000); see discussion infra Part VI.
208.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n).
209.
See discussion infra Part VI.
210.
See GLB § 102, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8); see also Di Lorenzo, supra note 199, at 37
(stating that the creation of a FHC is optional).
211.
See 12 USC § 1843(c)(8).
212.
Id.
213.
BHCA § 40)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 18430)(2)(A) (2000).
214. Id.
215.
See Garn-St. Germain, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2000).

COPYRIGHT © 2003 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

20031 PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM

101

(ii) activities other than "those of banking" and "closely
related to banking; '216 and/or
(iii) activities
complementary to "financial in nature"
•. .
211
activities.
As discussed in Section III of this article, activities "closely
related to banking" were reduced, but not eliminated, after the
enactment of the GLB.218 Most notably, a BHC may look for
authority to engage in such an activity, which had been approved
before November 11, 1999, but had not been approved for that
particular company.1 9 In addition, S&L activities have been
retained under section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, and the Board may
exercise the power to approve or reject such activity. 22 The test
applied for the second type of nonbanking activity, other than
"those of banking" and "closely related to banking," is an old
reference to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act, and has no real
application today. 2
However, the matter still remains

216.

12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2), (c)(8). Section 1843(a)(2) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no bank holding company
shall- (2) after two years from the date as of which it becomes a bank
holding company, ... retain direct or indirect ownership or control of
any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding
company or engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of
managing or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized under
this chapter .....
and (B) those permitted under [section 1843(c)(8)] ....
The Board is authorized ...

to extend the two year period ...

for not

more than one year at a time.., but no such extensions shall in the
aggregate exceed three years.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors, 195 F.3d
28, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting section 4 of the Bank Holding Act).
217.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
218.
See discussion infra Part III.
219.
GLB § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
220.
Press Release, Federal Reserve System, Order Approving the Formation of a
Bank Holding Company (July 2, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/bhc/2001/200107022/default.htm.
221.
In Independent Community Bankers of America v. Board of Governors of the
FederalReserve System, the court stated:
Travelers, the acquiring entity, was engaged in various activities,
mainly insurance, not allowed for bank holding companies under
exceptions (A) and (B).
Accordingly, the emerging bank holding
company could not lawfully "retain" stock in any subsidiary conducting
that business for more than two years after the transaction by which it
became a bank holding company. The Board thus made its approval of
the Travelers-Citicorp transaction contingent on a commitment that
Citigroup would conform to the two-year divestiture requirement.
195 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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unresolved because neither the Board nor the courts have
confronted this issue.
The need for a financial holding company to secure prior
approval from the Board before becoming involved in new
nonbanking activities is less stringent under the GLB.222 The
BHC Act and the Board's Regulation Y contain an obligatory
notice to the Board of at least 12 business days before a BHC can
become involved in new activities, but only if the BHC is eligible
for this shortcut and the Board order or regulation permits the
proposed activity.
If a BHC is not eligible for the expedited
processing or the activities are not permissible, the notice period
is longer. 4
GLB's relaxation is apparent with the 30 day "after-the-fact"
notice requirement for any intended activity that is "financial in
nature," determined from the list in the Act or approval by a
Board regulation or order.2 2 ' According to the General Counsel of
Bank of America Corporation, "[t]hus, with respect to bank
holding companies that elect 'financial holding company' status,
not only has the scope of permissible nonbanking activities been
expanded, but the Board's prior approval requirement for listed
or approved activities has been eliminated as well."22 A financial
holding company still has to apply to the Board if the nonbanking
activities are not listed and do not have the prior approval of the
B
227
Board .
GLB preserves a bank's existing authority to own an
operating subsidiary whether inside or completely outside the
BHC.2 28 The operating subsidiary is restricted, with limited
exceptions, to activities permitted to the parent bank.
In
addition, GLB permits the bank to own a financial subsidiary -a
subsidiary that engages in activities beyond those permitted to
the bank. 2 " Financial subsidiaries, if they become FHBs, may
engage in the broader range of activities that are "financial in
nature."31 Unlike financial subsidiaries, operating subsidiaries
222.
Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 7 (2000).
223.
See 12 U.S.C. §§1843(c)(8)-(j)(5)(B)(i); 12 C.F.R. § 225.23 (2002); see also Polking
& Cammarn, supra note 222.
224. See §§1843(c)(8),O)(1)(A), (3), (4)(C); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.23-.24 (2002); see also
Polking & Cammarn, supra note 222.
225.
GLB § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k); see also Polking & Cammarn, supra note 222.
226.
Polking & Cammarn, supra note 222, at 7.
227.
Id. at 7-8.
228.
GLB §121, 12 U.S.C § 24a (2000).
229.
Id.; see also Polking & Cammarn., supra note 222, at 10.
230.
GLB §121, 12 U.S.C. § 24a.
231.
Under the Act, national banks cannot own a Part 5 subsidiary unless it is a
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of banks which engage in activities that are part of the business
of banking are not subject to the operational conditions imposed
in the GLB.232 The GLB allows an FHC to engage in any activity
deemed to be "financial in nature." 233 National banks could elect
financial subsidiary status for their operating subsidiaries, if
they could meet requirements analogous to those for an FHC.234
If an activity:235 (i) is permissible for the bank itself, (ii) listed as
'financial in nature' under GLB, (iii) has been determined by the
OCC to be 'financialin nature' (and the Board has not disagreed),
or (iv) is 'incidental' to a financial activity, a financial subsidiary
of a bank may engage in it.2 3 However, specifically prohibited for
bank subsidiaries is the power to engage in underwriting of
insurance or providing or issuing annuities, real estate
investment or development, and merchant banking.
With
reference to merchant banking activities, the Board and the OCC
may review and remove this prohibition after five years. 231
Through GLB deliberations, the Board has advocated for the
limitation of the bank subsidiaries' power.239 On the other hand,
the OCC has argued for an expansion of the bank subsidiaries'
power, allowing them to carry out any financial activities,
including merchant banking activities.
Under GLB, the scope
of bank subsidiary activities is less than the scope of BHC
activities. This is presently a temporary victory for the Board
over the OCC.

"financial subsidiary," thus prevailing over the OCC's Part 5 regulations. Polking &
Cammarn, supra note 222, at 10 n.34.
232.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(e) (2000).
233.
GLB § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1).
234. Polking & Cammarn, supra note 222, at 10-11.
235.
The Act does not, however, confer similar interpretive authority on the
Treasury with respect to national bank financial subsidiaries.... Thus,
the Board has somewhat greater latitude to expand holding company
activities than does the Treasury with respect to national bank financial
subsidiary activities. Nonetheless, the OCC still has broad discretion
under the National Bank Act to determine that an activity is 'the
business of banking' or 'incidental' thereto, and therefore permissible for
a national bank or its operating subsidiary.
Id., at 11 n.37.
236.
Id. "Curiously, the Act permits a financial holding company to engage in
activities that are deemed by the Federal Reserve Board to be 'complimentary' to
financial-in-nature activities." Id.
237.
GLB § 121 (d)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 24(a)(2000). Insurance products authorized prior
to January 1, 1999 are grandfathered for national banks and their subsidiaries. GLB
§ 302, 15 U.S.C. § 6712 (2000).
238.
See GLB § 122, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000).
239.
Op-Sub Debate Heats Up as Regulators Consider Merits of H.R. 10, BANKING
POL'Y REP., June 15, 1998, at 5.
240.
Id.
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GLB confers on holding companies some degree of flexibility
in structuring these new activities by allowing most "financial in
nature" activities to be conducted either in the holding company
or in a bank's financial subsidiary. 241' At the same time, GLB's
functional regulation provisions provide for a common
supervisory scheme for these new activities.
The long range
impact of GLB, however, will become evident only after the bank
regulatory agencies refine the scope of permissible activities
under the "financial in nature" test, and after these agencies,
along with the SEC and state insurance regulators, adopt
regulations implementing GLB and imposing conditions,
procedures, and examination practices for the newly unified
financial services industry.
As stated before, the major contribution of GLB was allowing
bank affiliates to offer insurance and to underwrite securities.243
Since those businesses had previously been found to be "closely
related" to banking and were prohibited by special legislation,
this change was not accomplished through the introduction of the
financial holding company and its ability to offer activities of a
financial nature, but rather through repeal of the specific
prohibitory provisions. Would not those repeals have been
enough without the immense and complex sections of GLB? Of
course, GLB does other things and perhaps it was useful for them
to be regulated through a unique act. However, how much did
the "financial in nature" test add to the "closely related to
banking" test? In Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, the court discussed how
the "closely related to banking" test accords with the general
national sentiment that financial institutions should not be
large.244
The new "financial in nature" test essentially eliminates that
consideration from future judicial review. As a result, such a test
allows for the introduction of functions that are far from "closely
related to banking" and gives banking regulators new flexibility
to expand banking powers well beyond underwriting securities,
insurance activities and perhaps much more that limits the
current banking industry. Congress' intentions in drafting GLB
was to make "financial in nature" an easier test to meet than

241.
See GLB § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(A)-(b).
242.
See id. at § 24a(a)(2)(A)-(B), 24a(b)(2000).
243.
See Laurence H. Meyer, Implementing the Banking Reform Bill Poses New
Challenges, 19 BANKING POL'Y REP. at 4, Jan. 18, 2000.
244. See Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir.
1976), vacated in part, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977).
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"closely related to banking."24 5 Unlike the "closely related to
banking" test, the "financial in nature" test simply does not have
to be tied to bank powers at all.246
The new test introduces the banking industry to the
electronic age, enabling the Board to take into account changes in
the marketplace and technology that broadly affect the market
for financial products and services 2 as well as banking activities
approved for U.S. banks to be carried out overseas. This test
should allow the FHC's of the future to engage in a wider variety
of activities than are presently allowed .2 " This, of course, will be
achieved only if the Board takes a non-restrictive approach to
defining permissible activities, while avoiding prescriptions that
are too narrow.2 49
Although the basic features of banks are
simple, there is rarely anything simplistic about the Board and
its regulatory regime, which has struggled with and resisted
taking this approach to banking.25 The Board has more often
taken a "wait-and-see" approach, which is likely to lead to the
Board's imposition of unnecessary
restrictions towards
commercial banks, bank subsidiaries and bank holding
companies while important banking issues are neglected entirely.
Perhaps the fact that banking, commercial banking in particular,
continues to remain among the most heavily regulated
enterprises in the United States is a testament to the Board's
classic role 5

245.
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the
House Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong., 67-68 (May 2, 2001) (statement of Laurence H.
Meyer, Member, Bd of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
246.
See Robert M. Garsson, Leach's Bill Would Now Let Banks Launch Activities
and Products Without Fed Nod, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 1995, at 1995 WL 6911223.
247.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2000).
248.
See Samuel J. Baptista, the Financial Services Council Prepared Testimony
before the House Committee on Commerce, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance, and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Hazardous Materials
(June 8, 1995) (transcript available at Federal News Service 620 National Press
Building), available at http://openaccess.dialog.com/gov/cgi/confirmed?Flag=5980.
249.
See David J. Vitale, Vice Chairman, First Chicago Corporation, Prepared
Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial
Services (Apr. 4, 1995) (transcript available at Federal News Service, 620 National Press
Building, Washington, D.C. 20045), available at http://openaccess.dialog.com/gov/cgi/
confirmed?Flag=6012.
250.
See Baptista, supra note 248. Congress, followed by the Board, has constantly
taken a populist suspicion of financial institutions as unduly large, powerful, and
monopolistic, which underlies their history of political antagonism toward banks and
resulting efforts to restrict them.
251.
See Lawrence J. White, Legislating "Financial Modernization": Is the Game
Worth the Candle?, 22 REGULATION No. 3 (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regv22n3/reg22n3/modernization.pdf.
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The rapid developments of the electronic and technological
age in the financial market placed banks, prior to the GLB,
under a competitive disadvantage against other financial
institutions with regard to the sale of financial products and
services to their customers. In this respect, the GLB opened the
door for banks to achieve new levels of activity, compete more
aggressively in the market and experience opportunity for
increased profits. Technological developments and electronic
activities are two of the core forces transforming the banking
industry. Banks are adopting emerging technologies and
electronic activities both to meet customer demands for improved
and more convenient service, and also to realize potential cost
efficiencies provided by those technologies. 2 As a prime example,
remote delivery of products and services is increasingly
important to enhance efficiencies and maintain profitability.
Several different types of technologies, the best known of which
is Internet banking, are emerging.2 " Banks that currently
operate Internet sites plan to expand aggressively the size and
functionality of their sites. By the year 2000, for example, banks
representing more than thirty-seven percent of deposits based
within the U.S. already had full service Internet banking. 4
Banks are also beginning to experiment with new payment
systems such as stored value and smart card systems.
Technology has fundamentally changed the nature of bank
competition, as well as the marketplace in which banks compete.
Technology is driving a convergence of information related
industries, including banking, telecommunications, and software
252.
See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr. The Business of Banking:
Looking to the Future-Part II, 52 BUSINESS LAWYER 1279, 1301 (1997) (citing Steve
Weber, Direct Channels Seen as Saviors from Banks' Declining Margins, 1 ONLINE
BANKING NEWSLETTER, Apr. 29, 1996, at 1 (transcript available at the Business Lawyer,
University of Maryland School of Law)). For example, the average cost per transaction
conducted by Internet banking is estimated to be $0.01 compared to $1.07 for the same
transaction at a full service branch. Id. at 1301 n.192 (citing Booz, et al., Internet
Banking: A Survey of Current and Future Development (transcript available The Business
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law)). Similarly, use of the smart card in retail
debit and credit payments is expected to enable banks to make authorized payments and
extend credit using a local online technology and, thereby, to lower cost and reduce fraud
significantly. See Jerome Svigals, Multiple Application Smart Card Will Be an Engine of
Profitability, 161 AM. BANKER, May 14, 1996, at 17.
253.
Julie L. Williams & James F. E. Gillespie, The Business of Banking: Looking to
the Future - Part II, 52 Bus. LAW, 1279, 1301-02 n.93 (1997) (reporting "16% of U.S.
households representing 30% of retail banking profits will be using Internet banking" and
"[b]y the year 2000, 40% of U.S. households are expected to have personal computers with
modems")
254. See Karen Furst, et al., Internet Banking in the U.S.: Landscape, Prospects,
Industry Implications, CAPCO J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION, at 45, 48 (Sept. 2001), available
at http://www.capco.com/pdf/j02art04.pdf.
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firms. Banks already are facing increasing competition from
nonbanks that offer payment services that build upon the bank
supplied payments system, but add features that provide
customers additional information, convenience, and timeliness.
To meet this competition, banks face pressure to develop banking
products that "wrap information and other value added elements
around" traditional payment services. 256
The "financial in nature" test permits functions that are not
necessarily "closely related to banking," and thereby allows the
U.S. banking industry to enter the electronic age. It is consistent
with the branch banking expansions, the trend of mergers and
acquisitions in the banking sector, and the increased presence of
U.S. banks overseas.
The future still remains unpredictable in terms of how close
banking regulators will allow banks to expand their financial
services and products into commercial activities. However, what
seems predictable is that the Congress and the banking
regulatory agencies will now be forced to monitor technology
developments closely and remain aware of their impact on the
financial market thereby ensuring that the U.S. banking
industry can remain competitive. 5 7
Another banking regulatory agency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation,
upon analyzing GLB, is of the opinion
the Board needs to exercise particular caution in easing
restrictions on banking activities beyond those actually defined
under the act as "financial in nature." 59 FDIC refers to the fact
that the GLB allows the Board, in coordination with the
Treasury (OCC), to define additional activities as "financial in
nature," besides the activities already established by the GLB,
and believes that any rapid expansion of such activities could
have undesirable consequences regarding the safety of bank
depository institutions as well as the stability of the financial
market. °
255.
See William S. Haraf, Public Policy Issues Will Influence Banking's Role in
Electronic Commerce, BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 2.
256.
Id.
257.
Representative Jim Leach, Address at the Women in Housing and Finance
Conference (Feb. 27, 1995), in LEXIS BANKING BULL., March 8, 1995.
258.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's mission is to "maintain stability
and public confidence in the nation's financial system." See Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, http://www.lnatbanker.com/fdic.htm.
To achieve this goal, the FDIC has
insured deposits and promoted safe and sound banking practices since 1933. Id.
259.
See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. FinancialServices
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 220 n.7 (2002).
260.
See Ricki Helfer, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Address before the House
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The distribution of regulatory authorities over "financial in
nature" activities between the Treasury and the Board, 26 ' and the
unusual set of provisions coordinating the regulatory activities
complicate the regulatory environment within which the concept
of "financial in nature" will unfold. Reaching a firm conclusion
as to how the Board and the OCC will eventually come out in
this power and policy sharing is a tricky matter. The often vague
or inconclusive wording in the GLB is already raising questions
and issues that will not be decided until the various task forces,
primarily from the Board and the OCC, finish drafting the new
rules and regulations.
In the political fencing between the Board and the OCC it
appears that the Board came out better.6
This is the result of
the Board moving significantly closer to achieving its longcoveted position of being the umbrella regulator for all of the
nation's financial institutions, both bank and non-bank, with
more detailed express authority over FHCs than it has over
BHCs. On the other hand, the OCC - with only national banks
under its supervision - began the controversy in a considerably
weaker position than the Board and, with the Treasury's support,
was remarkably successful in holding off most efforts to
undermine its position as the agency having primary
responsibility for the viability, competitive strength, and
soundness of the national banking system.
Even though GLB made some effort to place limitations on
the Board's new authority, in practice the Board is likely to be a
"first among equals" regulator with an ability to invite itself to
the table with other federal and state financial regulators
Committee on Banking and Financial Services (May 22, 1997), available at 1997 WL
271595 (F.D.C.H.). Under the "financial in nature" test, each industry (banking,
securities, insurance or real estate) has different levels of concentration and uses its own
yardstick to measure its concentration. Therefore, there is a system of concentration that
operates among the entities of the same industry and among various industries. At this
stage, it does not seem clear whether, taken either separately or together, concentration
in these industries could pose any potential risk in maintaining stability in the financial
market as well as towards creation of monopolies.
261.
See GLB §121, 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(3)(A), (b)(1)(B) (2000) (authorizing regulation
of services "financial in nature" by Secretary of the Treasury and FRB, and requiring
coordination between the agencies).
262.
See GLB § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(E)(i)-(ii) (2000) (streamlining bank
holding company supervision by requiring FRB deference to SEC reports of examination
of registered broker-dealers and investment advisers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3)(A)
(prohibiting FRB imposition of capital rules where SEC has acted); 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)
(limiting the operation of the "source-of-strength" doctrine with respect to firms
supervised by the SEC); GLB § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (requiring SEC consultation with
FRB and concurrence of FRB concerning SEC imposition of broker or dealer registration
requirements with respect to any new hybrid product); see also GLB § 115, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1820a, 1831v (imposing limitations on authority of other federal bank regulatory
agencies corresponding to those imposed on the FRB).

COPYRIGHT © 2003 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

20031 PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM

109

whenever serious issues arise. The nature of the Board's
regulatory reach initially led many observers to conclude that the
OCC must, therefore, have been the loser, and that the battle
263
was now over.
Actually, the OCC was left in a surprisingly powerful
position. An activity cannot be found to be "financial in nature"
and thus permissible for a FHC without concurrence of the
OCC. 2 4' This applies even to FHCs over which the OCC has no
regulatory jurisdiction at all.
In that sense, it must be
acknowledged that the OCC obtained a major increase in its
regulatory reach as a result of the GLB. The Board, in its
increased jurisdiction over national bank subsidiaries also
expanded its jurisdiction. Thus, both came out of the legislative
controversy with a consequential area to regulate.
Certain issues, like the content of activities that are
"financial in nature," such as in the case of deciding whether the
activities in real estate brokerage and real estate management
services were "financial in nature,"2 5 are necessary concomitants
of advancement in the technology sector and rapid development
of the financial market. In a sense, these advancements are to be
welcomed as indicative of the dynamic quality of this developing
regulatory system.
V.

COMPLEMENTARY TO A FINANCIAL ACTIVITY

Section 103(a) of GLB delineates a set of permissible
activities for an FHC to engage in, provided these activities are
"complementary to a financial activity."2 6 6 Since these are not
financial activities in and of themselves, they must be nonfinancial activities, or something generally called commerce. The
underlying assumption of the BHCA and the GLB amendments
263.
See Steve Blumenthal, Fed May Wind Up Regulating Nonbank Financial
Businesses,AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 2001, at 12.
264.
Malloy, supra note 163, at 801-02.
265.
In January of 2001, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Board) and the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) began seeking comment on whether
to determine by rule that real estate brokerage and real estate management are activities
that are "financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial activity" and therefore
permissible for financial holding companies (FHCs) and financial subsidiaries of national
banks. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control [and] Financial
Subsidiaries, 66 Fed. Reg. 307 (proposed Jan. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225,
1501). The Fed's proposed rule would amend Regulation Y to add real estate brokerage
and real estate management to the list of activities permissible for FHCs. Id. The
Secretary's proposed rule would amend its financial subsidiary regulations to add real
estate brokerage and real estate management to the activities permissible for financial
subsidiaries of national banks. Id. The deadline for receipt of comments on these
proposals was March 2, 2001. Id.
266.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2000).
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is that non-financial activity, commerce, is prohibited to bank
holding companies. 27 An activity found to be "complementary," is
distinguished from the more general list of commercial activities
that Congress considered for FHCs and rejected. 211 Yet, if it is
complementary to a financial activity, it is permitted.
To qualify as complementary, and therefore permissible for
FHCs, there must be some close connection between the
complementary activity and an activity that the statute, a Board
decision, or an OCC decision has found to be "financial in
nature."2 91 Presumably, the activity must actually be conducted
by the involved FHC. The Board wrote the following:
The authority to engage in complementary
activities was included as a mechanism for
allowing some
amount
of commercial or
nonfinancial activities as long as there is a
connection between the complementary activity
and a financial activity conducted by the FHC and
the activity does not pose unacceptable risks to the
safety and soundness
of the FHC, its banks or the
20
banking system.
Before a complementary activity may be engaged in by an
FHC, it must be found acceptable by the Board.2 7' No activity is
deemed complementary through operation of the BHCA or GLB.
Part of this finding involves a Board determination that the
activity "does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system
generally."2 7 2 One does not know quite what to do with this
qualification. For one thing, one would assume that all Board
decisions incorporate such a finding. For another, is there a
negative implication that all other findings may pose such a risk?
The complementary concept may fairly be seen as an aspect
of Congress' appreciation of the expanding nature of markets and

267.
Glass, supra note 177, at 17-18.
268.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384
(proposed Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (demonstrating a scenario in
which the Board distinguishes "complementary" activities).
269.
Id. at 80,385.
270.
Id. at 80,385.
271.
GLB § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
272.
Id. The finding must be made under the notice procedures of the BHCA. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(4)0) (2000); see Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Federal Reserve Board,
Remarks Before the American Law Institute and American Bar Association (Feb. 3, 2000)
(transcript available at http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000203.htm).
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technology.
It is thus completely consistent with the
underpinnings of "financial in nature" itself and the future scope
that is given to the regulation of banking. It is reflective of the
broad license Congress obviously intends to grant the Board and
the OCC. One hopes that the regulators in the same spirit
receive this posture.
Describing the meaning of a complementary activity proves
difficult. Equally difficult at this stage in the development of
GLB amendments is to comprehend any understanding of the
importance this category of activities will achieve. As to the
former issue, any idea as to the Board's intentions appears in a
December 2000 proposed rule.
First, the Board independently
indicated it is thinking about "certain types of data storage,
Internet and portal hosting activities, and broad advisory
activities involving data processing activities, so long as the
companies also provide financial data processing or other
financial products and services." 274 Second, the Board looked
favorably in the proposed rule on three proposals put to it for a
"complementary" determination:
1. Data Storage for any type of data so long as the
custodian provides these services for financial
data;
2. General data processing, without limit as to the
type of data processed, so long as 20 percent of
the total revenue from these activities is
derived from providing data processing services
to the companies in the FHC;
3. Electronic
information
portal
services
comprising information search, exchange,
consolidation,
screening,
filtering
or
aggregation services involving any type of
data.
Presently, the proposed rule has not been adopted in final form.
Unfortunately, it does appear to conform to the rather
conservative Board approach to banking that GLB was designed
to liberate.

273.
274.
275.

Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,384.
Id.
Id. at 80,386.

COPYRIGHT © 2003 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

112 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III
VI. ACTIVITIES "NON-FINANCIAL IN NATURE"

In 1956, Congress enacted the Act, defining a BHC as "any
company which has control over any bank."27" The Act derived
not from a bank but from a business corporation which
traditionally, having obtained a state charter, was allowed to
engage in any business whatsoever. In 1970, in order to prevent
BHCs from engaging in the businesses of both banking and
ordinary commerce, the Board convinced Congress to amend the
Act making very clear that the activities of banking and
commerce cannot be performed by the same business entity or be
intermingled.27 7 At least one commentator believes that the
separation of banking from commerce is both artificial and
stultifying.
To understand the difference between the business of
banking and commerce, first, the banking industry looks at their
definitions and scope of activities in the perspective of U.S.
banking law. "Banking" at a minimum means the activities of
making commercial loans and holding demand deposits. 9
"Commerce" means any activity that is strictly non-financial in
nature. 2 " For example, operating a factory, running a retail
store, or selling burgers would be the kinds of activities falling
under the definition of "commerce."2 81 GLB revisited the business
of banking and commerce with respect to the structure and
activities of FHCs.
Other than the as yet thin sliver of
complementary activities,2 82 the GLB prohibits mixing banking
and "commerce" in financial services holding companies,
including the constituent banks. 8 3
Two major groups represent opposing views in regard to the
combination of banking and commerce. There are those who
276.

12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2000).

277.
See supra Part III.
278.
See Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking from Securities and
Commerce in the Modern FinancialMarketplace, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 583, 654 (1991).
279. For a detailed analysis about the business of banking, see supra Part II.
280.
The term "commerce" has been identified with "non-financial in nature"
activities, which is the wording used in the GLB.
281.
Minor aspects of this commerce division are, for particular reasons, handled
irregularly under the mix of banking laws. For example, small business investment
companies, certain investments under Federal Reserve Regulation K dealing with foreign
investments, or holdings under five percent of the shares of companies under sections
4(c)(6) and 4 (c)(7) of the BHC Act may be controlled by BHCs pre-GLB. See Bank
Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 Fed. Reg. 16,460, 16,461 (proposed
Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225, 1500).
282.
See discussion supra Part V.
283.
See Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Implementing the
Banking Reform Bill Poses New Challenges, Address before Washington, D.C. - based
group Women in Housing and Finance, in BANKING POL'Y REP., Jan. 18, 2000, at 4.

COPYRIGHT © 2003 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

20031 PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM

113

argue that banking and commerce should remain separated,284
and others who believe that the gulf between banking and
commerce could be cautiously bridged.
In support of the
combination is the traditional role commerce has played in
banking in the United States.2 8
Eliminating the current
separation of banking and commerce would create a new world of
benefits, although attendant risks would ensue for the banks and
their activities. 87
Many years before the enactment of the GLB, the Board
stated "the separation of banking from commerce [is created] in
order to guard against the potential concentration of financial
resources, conflicts of interest, in the control of credit, and risks
to insured depository institutions that are likely to result from
the
control by banking
organizations
of commercial
enterprises. 88 Taking into consideration this position of the
Board, which remains the Board's current position, those who
support the concept of division between commerce and banking
follow some major arguments, including the following:
1. potential expansion of the federal safety net;
2. potential increased concentration of economic power;
3. potential regulation for
depository institutions;

commercial

parent

of

4. potential for increased contagion effects; and
2
5. potential for increased conflicts of interest.

89

The potential expansion of the federal safety net could lead
to the creation of conglomerations of banks and commercial firms
284. See generally Jonathan Brown, The Separation of Banking and Commerce, GIS
for Equitable and Sustainable Communities, at http://www.public-gis.org/reports/sbc.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
285.
See James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist, U.S. General Accounting Office,
Statement Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on Financial
Regulation: Bank Modernization Legislation, http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/
5797gao.htm (May 7, 1997).
286.
See generally Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business
Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 1011 (2001) (discussing the history of American banking).
287.
Bothwell, supra note 285.
288.
See Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Orders Issued By the Board of
Governors, 69 FED. RESERVE BULL. No. 2 105, 108 (1983).
289.
See infra notes 290-317 and accompanying text.
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that would increase the risk to the safety net, and any associated
subsidy might be transferred to commercial operations and result
in inappropriate risk-taking, misallocations of resources, and
uneven competitive playing fields in other industries. While
establishing firewalls between banks and their commercial
affiliates could possibly mitigate such risks, such firewalls may
not work in times of stress, or where managers are determined to
evade them.
The end of current restrictions and the consequent formation
of very large conglomerate enterprises could result in unhealthy
concentrations of economic power. This could
"adversely affect the efficient operation of the
economy and place consumers at risk of increased
prices if they began to exert market power in
either their banking or commercial operations.
This risk would be enhanced to the extent that
these new conglomerates could effectively access
the subsidy inherent in the safety net and gain
further advantages over their competitors."29'
Other opponents of banking - commerce linkages, including
House Banking Chairman Jim Leach, have raised the specter of
unfair competition if banks and commercial companies
combine.
He has argued that in protecting the interest of its
own affiliates, banks would be expected not to lend to competitors
or potential rivals of the affiliates. 9 3
The elimination of barriers between banking and commercial
activities will open the doors to a vast restructuring of the U.S.
business place, and there are fears that banks will abandon their
traditional role of impartial provider of credit. "No longer," says
Congressman Leach, "would banking be simply a service to the
general public and commercial and industrial firms. Instead
290.
Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, General Government
Programs, Using "Firewalls" in a Post Glass-Steagall Banking Environment, Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Energy and
Commerce (Apr. 13, 1988), http://161.203.164/d48t13/135537.pdf.
291.
See Press Release, Congressman James A. Leach, Leach Releases GAO Study
Warning Against Mixing of Commerce and Banking (March 27, 1997) (http://financial
services.house.gov/banking/prdutoc.htm) (quoting General Accounting Office Study on
Separation of Commerce and Banking).
292.
See Steve Cocheo, Special Briefing: The Banking-Commerce Debate; Socks,
stocks, wrenches, deposits, cars, loans, hamburgers, computers, A.B.A. BANKING J., July
1997, at 7.

293.

Id.
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banks would become integrated into these firms, and could own
or be owned by companies as diverse as Wal-Mart, Sony, Amoco,
Avon or Microsoft [with consequent loyalty to their financial
success].,,294
The affect on competition and concentration of
ownership of corporate America due to the combination of
banking and commerce present legitimate and longstanding
concerns.
In large part, such concerns also indicate conglomerated
banks would continue the process already under way to create a
dominant and controlling market with other banks of the same
size. Although there has been no foreshadowing, antitrust issues
may eventually be exposed .
A strong inverse relationship
exists between the size of a bank and the extent of lending to
small businesses, as expressed as a percent of bank assets.9
Evidence has shown that larger, more complex banks do not
provide as much credit to small businesses as do smaller, simpler
banks.97 Small businesses are typically more dependent on bank
credit than large businesses, and it is possible that the shifts
occurring will diminish the availability of credit to them.
There is, however, a good case for banks to engage in nonfinancial activity, especially where technological innovation has a
prominent place, because today's banks are at the forefront of
new product development.
But the unrestricted mixing of
banking and commerce does raise particular concerns.
For
example, conglomerated banks will have an advantage over less
diversified banks in supporting research and innovation and in
selling new products and services.29 ' However a flourishing
industry in new product development, financial consulting and
marketing can supply these ingredients to smaller banks in
sufficient quantity. The idea is not inconceivable that use of the
wide market in technological facilities could outdo any large
private bank's internal resources.

294. See Congressman James A. Leach, Chairman, House Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, Statement before Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities,
and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, (Feb. 12, 1997).
295.
See Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. White, De Novo Banks and Lending to
Small Businesses: An EmpiricalAnalysis, J. BANKING & FIN. 851, 864 (1997) (considering
antitrust implications of the mergers of local banks, which primarily lend to small
businesses).

296.
Id. at 853-54.
297.
See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Summary, Universal Banking and the
Future of Small Business Lending, Financial Institutions Center, http://fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/95/p9517.html (Apr. 1995).
298.
See INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 659 (F.M.
Scherer & David Ross eds., 3d ed. 1990) (discussing the advantages of diversified size in
business).
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In addition, the integration of banking and commerce could
quickly lead to foreign commercial and industrial firms gaining
access to the U.S. payments systems, discount windows, and
deposit insurance.
The extent of oversight and control the
Federal government could have over these ventures would be
small. We are, after all, dealing with the entry of commercial
enterprises - essentially unregulated - into the American market.
The degree of liability exposures toward their clients would,
however, be practically unlimited.
It seems plain that GLB
never intended to accomplish this kind of integration. On the
House floor Representative Leach was quite clear that the GLB
repudiates the mixing of banking and commerce:
[WIhile the financial modernization legislation
provides for increased competition in the delivery
of financial products, it repudiates the Japanese
industrial model and forestalls trends toward
mixing commerce and banking. The signal breach
of banking [and commerce that exists in current
law is plugged, which has the effect of stopping
the] potential [adaption of the Japanese banking
system structure and supervisory] °° of the
American economy ....
At many stages in
consideration of bank modernization legislation,
powerful interest groups attempted to introduce
legislative language which would have allowed
large banks to merge with large industrial
concerns-i.e., to provide that Chase could merge
with General Motors or Bank of America with
Amoco. Instead, this bill precludes this prospect
and, indeed, blocks America's largest retail
company from owning a federally insured
institution, for which an application is pending.3"'
The Senate Report on GLB when in bill form also spoke to the
prohibition of a general mixing of banking and commerce.
In
explaining what the Board must consider in establishing new
activities that are "financial in nature" or "incidental to financial
activities," the Report asserts:
299.
See Leach, supra note 294.
300.
See Bayan Rahman, Japan Tries to Dispel Fears Over Banking System, FIN.
TIMES, December 28, 2001, Asia/Pacific Section at 10 (discussing the current weakness of
Japan's banking system and the resulting bank losses and collapses).
301.
145 CONG. REC. H11,529-30 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1999) (statement of Rep. Leach).
302.

S. REP. No. 106-44, at 21 (1999).
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This authority includes authority to allow
activities that are reasonably connected to one or
more financial activities ....
This authority
provides the Board with some flexibility to
accommodate
the
affiliation
of depository
institutions with insurance companies, securities
firms, and other financial service providers while
continuing to be attentive not to allow the general
mixing of banking and commerce in contravention
of the purposes of this Act.303
In addition, Representative Leach spoke to what he and his
colleagues intended regarding the mix of banking and commerce
in his remarks to the Conference of State Banking Supervisors at
their meeting in May 2000:
[olf all the things I am proud of in the
modernization
legislation
it
is that
our
government's two principal financial bodies-the
Treasury and the Fed-changed judgment [sic]
and today adamantly stand with me against
mixing commerce and banking. There should be
no misunderstanding. If this precept had been
included in the final legislative product, I would
have done my best to pull the plug on financial
modernization.° 4
Risk was also perceived that the independence of all banks,
particularly our largest, would have been jeopardized if
commercial firms had been allowed to combine with them
because these firms could have seen banks as a potential profit
source with somehow measurable limited risks.30 ' According to
some studies released several years ago regarding market
valuations, "such companies as GE, BP-Amoco, AOL-Time
Warner and Microsoft could and would eagerly gobble up even
such financial giants such as Citigroup, Chase and Wells
Fargo."3 °6 The face of economic organization in America might
303.
Id.
304.
Congressman James A. Leach, Remarks at the Conference of State Banking
Supervisors (May 12, 2000), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/
prdu1062.htm (last modified May 17, 2000).
305.
Id.
306.
Id.
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have been revolutionized overnight had the Congress, the Board,
and the other regulatory agencies not continued to maintain a
careful watch on issues of this nature."7 Through the enactment
of GLB, Congress "recognizes the direction of the market, allows
for freer competition within financial services without
sanctioning mergers among auto companies, retail chains and
banks."" 8 Whatever its limitations on bank diversification, GLB
may be seen as establishing a scheme of regulation to protect the
public's trust and confidence in the U.S. banking system." 9
Some banking experts have questioned whether anyone can
adequately regulate a commercial parent of a depository
institution. Is the Board, for instance, capable of overseeing the
activities of a large automaker because it owns a bank? A report
from the FDIC, regarding the issue of the merger of bank and
thrift charters partially answers this question: "[blecause
unrestricted savings-and-loan holding companies are essentially
310
unregulated, only limited data on their activities exist."
Chairman Greenspan said the "Board also has concluded that it
would be wise to move with caution in addressing the removal of
the current legal barriers between commerce and banking
because the unrestricted association of banking and commerce
would be a profound and surely irreversible structural change in
the U.S. economy." 31' If the Congress were to dramatically
change the rules through some BHCA/GLB expansion, thus
governing the separation between banking and commerce, the
result could bring great uncertainty in the market to the bank
safety net. As a result, Congress could do more harm than good.
Accordingly, modifications of the fundamental banking structural
rules and regulations regarding the separation of banking and
commerce should proceed at a deliberate pace in order to test the
response of markets and technological innovations to the future
alteration of banking rules.
Allowing the conglomeration of banks and commercial firms
could also increase risks to the deposit insurance fund and
taxpayers burden if commercial firms were to extend to their
307.
Id.
308.
See Congressman James A. Leach, Chairman, House Banking and Financial
Services Committee, Remarks before ABA Leadership Council (Mar. 28, 2000), available
at http://www.house.gov/leach/aba.htm.
309.
Id.
310.
See FDIC Staff, A Unified Federal Charterfor Banks and Savings Institutions,
10 BANKING REV. No. 1, at 10 n.20 (Summer 1997), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
banking/1997summ/index.html.
311.
See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Statement before the
Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Commerce,
July 17, 1997, 83 FED. RESERVE BULL. 738, 738 (1997).
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banking affiliates any financial stress they experience.
Even if
prudential barriers were established to keep such a problem from
actually being transmitted to bank affiliates, depositors who
believed commercial affiliates were experiencing financial
problems might decide to withdraw their funds from the
commercial firms' bank affiliates for fear that the banks'
soundness might also be in jeopardy.3 13 "If enough depositors did
this, the fear could be self-fulfilling in that the viability of both
the affiliated banks and the commercial firms could become
threatened."" 4
Allowing conglomeration of banks and commercial firms
could also add to the potential for increased conflicts of interest
and raise the risk that banks might engage in anticompetitive or
unsound practices. For example, some have argued that, to
foster the prospects of their commercial affiliates, banks might
begin to restrict credit to their affiliates' competitors, or tie the
provision of credit to the sale of products by their commercial
affiliates.1 5 Perhaps more likely, banks might begin to extend
credit to their commercial affiliates when they would not have
done so otherwise, thus increasing the risk of loss, risks to the
deposit insurance funds, and potential taxpayer loss. 316 Some
policy makers have expressed particular concern that commercial
affiliates of depository institutions, especially when facing
financial troubles, could sustain defaults which could bring
failure to these depository institutions. 37
This could have
irreversible systemic impact on the financial market and weaken
the "legendary" reputation of the bank safety network.
On the other hand, some commentators contest the
prevailing wisdom and encourage a growing combination of
banks with commerce. 318 This view must, of course, contend with
the clear position taken for most of this century by Congress and
the Board that banking and commerce should not mix. These
advocates claim that such a step only ratifies current market
realities, including commercial ownership of thrifts and nonbank
312.
313.
314.
315.

See Leach, supra note 291.
Id.
Id.
See Anthony Saunders, Banking and Commerce: An Overview of the Public
Policy Issues, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 231, 239-40 (1994).
316.
See United States General Accounting Office GAO/GGD-94-88, BANK INSIDER
ACTIVITIES:

INSIDER PROBLEMS

AND VIOLATIONS

INDICATE

BROADER

MANAGEMENT

DEFICIENCIES 16 (March 1994) (describing "insider abuse can occur through transactions
between a member bank and its affiliates").
317.
Saunders, supra note 315, at 241.
318.
See Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the FinancialService Industry:
Causes, Consequences, and Implicationsfor the Future,23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135 (1999).
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banks, and the incursion of commercial firms into some
traditional banking activities.3 19
The major arguments expressed regularly in support of
authorizing the combination of banking and commerce are the
following:
1. potential increased economies of scale;
2. potential increase of international competition
between U.S. banks and foreign banks; and
3. greater diversification of risks.
Some banking experts claim the U.S. banking industry
would benefit from the relaxation of banking and commerce
restrictions because it would allow banks to expand their scale of
operations and lower their unit costs of production and data
management.3 2°The presence of significant increased economies of
scale in the banking sector has led to banking consolidation over
the last decade.32'
These
increased
economies have
caused
dramatic
consolidation specifically in the banking industry during the last
decade, while the increased economies have not affected the
financial services industry to the same degree.2
For instance,
the ten largest banking organizations in the United States
accounted for twenty-seven percent of all operating income in the
financial services industry in 1990, compared to forty-five
percent in 1999.323
Also supporting increased U.S. bank powers is the fact that
U.S. banks must compete in an increasingly international
market where many of the major foreign competitors have
commercial affiliations which give them an advantage over U.S.

319.
See generally Arthur K. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformationof the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 421-23 (2002).

320.
321.

See Berger, supra note 318.
See George J. Bentson et al., Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructuring and

Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING 435 (1982).
322.

See

SEC.

INDUS.

ASS'N,

2001

SEC.

INDUS.

FACT

BOOK

40

(2001)

at

http://www.sia. com/reference materials/pdf/200lFactBook.pdf
(explaining that, in
securities the share of revenue from the top ten firms accounted for 50.7 percent of
industry revenues in 1999, down from 56.9 percent in 1990).
323.
See Franklin Allen, James McAndrews & Philip E. Strahan, E-Finance: An
Introduction 14, Publ'n 01-36, (Oct. 7, 2001) (manuscript) at http://www.bc.edu/-strahan/
EFinanceIntro7.pdf.
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banking institutions.3 24 For example, it would be quite difficult
for a U.S. chartered bank to compete effectively in German
markets where its German competitors are actively involved in
air transport and many other commercial enterprises.
The argument for greater diversification of risk is the
historical and traditional economic argument that risk is more
sustainable if diversified.3 25 Shakespeare eloquently conveyed
this idea in The Merchant of Venice, Act I, Scene 1, in a
conversation between Salerio, a Venetian trader, and Antonio,
the merchant of Venice:
Salerio: I know Antonio
Is sad to think upon his merchandise.
Antonio: Believe me, no; I thank my fortune for it,
My ventures are not in one bottom
trusted,
Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of this present year:
Therefore my merchandise makes me not
sad.3
Proponents of this portfolio theory believe that banks would be
benefited and their overall risks reduced by allowing for greater
diversification across more product lines. 32 7' Because the gains
from this type of diversification rise when firms' earnings are less
correlated and fall when firms' earnings are more correlated, this
argument rests on the assumption that the earnings of
commercial firms fluctuate independently of the earnings of
banks.2 8
However, a more comprehensive study covering a longer
period of time and greater control over more factors, found that
the variation in the stock returns of bank holding companies and
nonfinancial companies are highly correlated, and the study
concluded that the benefits of diversification are overstated. 32 9' By
324.
Statement of Lawrence H. Meyer, FRB Governor, Testimony Before the
Committee on the Judiciary (June 3, 1998), in 84 FED. RES. BULL. 619 (Aug. 1998).
325.
See Christopher T. Mahoney & Cara S. Lown, Banking and Securities and
Insurance: Economists' Views of the Synergies, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y
REV., at 5, Oct. 1, 2000.
326.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 1.

327.
See Saunders, supra note 315, at 236.
328.
See Anthony Saunders & Pierre Yourougou, Are Banks Special? The Separation
of Banking from Commerce and Interest Rate Risk, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 171, 181 (1990).
329.
See Michael J. Isimbabi, The Stock Market Perception of Industry Risk and the
Separation of Banking and Commerce, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 325, 342-43 (1994).
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combining with commercial firms, banks might obtain better
information about the commercial firms' activities, which the
banks could then use to reduce the default rate on their loans.33 °
The commercial firms could benefit by obtaining bank loans at
lower interest rates.3 3' Neither argument, however, involves the
subject of portfolio diversification.
Some observers have also argued that restrictions on bank
affiliations lead to inefficiencies, because such restrictions
impede the free flow of capital or managerial resources.332 In
addition, they feel that commercial ownership would bring more
capital into banking.333 In recent years, this has not presented a
problem because many banks have been buying back stock and
using excess capital.334 But capital excesses could disappear in a
prolonged economic downturn. Based on a report issued from the
FDIC, commercial companies have not historically been a source
of risk to the thrift industry, where the intricacies of the thrift
holding company structure have supported closer alliance of
banks with commerce than exists in the commercial bank field.335
Also, a report from the Office of Thrift Supervision asserts
unitary thrift holding companies have historically helped rather
than harmed their subsidiaries.336
A central aspect of the entire issue of the relationship
between financial activities and commerce is whether any real
distinction exists between the two. At lease one commentator
argued for the lack of a distinction. 337 Alternatively, another
commentator contends that since a commercial activity is
anything the Board says it is, this in itself creates the
separation. 338 By permitting banks to affiliate with securities
330.
See Kose John, et al., Universal Banking and Firm Risk-Taking, 18 J. BANKING
& FIN. 307, 309 (1994).
331.
See id. at 308 (explaining that acquisition of a bank by a commercial firm can
lead to growth in both size of the institution and the scope of its activities and thus reduce
average costs of producing banking services).
332.
See Saunders, supra note 315, at 237.
333.
Id. at 234-35.
334. Edward D. Herlihy, et al., Materials Submitted by Craig M. Wasserman, at 397,
587 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B0-00ZO, 2001).
335.
FDIC Maps Problems in Crafting Common Charter, BANKING POL'Y REP.,
Dec. 16, 1996, at 4.
336.
Steve Cocheo, Special Briefing: The Banking- Commerce Debate, A.B.A.
BANKING J., July 1997, at 7.
337.
See Prepared Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee Financial
Institutions & Consumer Credit Subcommittee Concerning H.R. 268, the Depository
Institution Affiliation and Thrift Charter Conversion Act, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13,
1997, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Federal News Service File.
338.
See Peter J. Wallison, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Eliminated the Separation
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firms and insurance companies, Congress has now admitted that
the affiliation confers no improper benefits on affiliates. One
may derive from this that the Board cannot determine whether
to permit an affiliation by deciding whether it could confer an
anticompetitive benefit, or would potentially harm the bank.
Instead, it must decide what is or is not a financial activity
without reference to any policy or precedent standard. As a
result, some commentators state that (i) there is no natural
distinction between financial activities, such as insurance and
securities underwriting, and commercial activities generally, and
(ii) that there is no practical basis for doing so.339
In justifying the above view, these commentators provide the
following example related to leasing activity which clearly is
included in the "family" of financial activities: they state that
there is no difference between a company which buys cars and
then leases them out (which transaction constitutes a financial
activity, since banks are permitted to buy and lease equipment,
in our case, cars), and a company which buys the engines from
Ford, the body from Honda, the transmissions from GM and
assembles the cars that it leases OUt. 34 ° Is the Board going to say
that a company that buys the equipment that it leases can be
affiliated with a bank, while a company that assembles the same
equipment cannot? Does that distinction make any sense?
Although there are no particular cases in which the Board
has ruled with reference to commercial firms engaged in the
above transactions, the current state of the law sets up a clear
difference between a company that buys equipment for lease and
is consequently in the business of financing, and one that
assembles equipment that it leases in commerce. Whether such
distinction makes any sense is another question.
The Board has made clear that it would be wise to tread
carefully in removing the legal barriers between commerce and
finance. 341'
The free and open association of banking and
commerce would be a profound and surely irreversible structural
of Banking and Commerce: How This Will Affect the Future of The Safety Net, Address
Before the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Conference on Bank Structure &
Competition (May 5, 2000) (manuscript at 2, at http://www.aei.org/sp/spwallOO0505.htm).
339.
Id. at 2. See also Pssst! Reform Really Did Let Commerce In, AM. BANKER,
June 2, 2000, at 1 (discussing Peter J. Wallison's view that restrictions on commercial
activities will fall as the line between financial and commercial activities is continually
redrawn).
340.
Wallison, supra note 338, at 3.
341.
See Statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 249, 253 (Feb. 13, 1997).
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change in the American economy. Hence, the Board must be
sure whatever changes are made do not distort our development
toward the most efficient financial structure.342 However, the
Board allows for some flexibility in the matter of merging
banking and commerce.343 In this respect, the Chairman states
that there is "no reason not to proceed in incremental steps.
The first phase is to tackle those banks that already operate in
an environment of non-financial commerce and integrate banking
and finance only in those areas. Chairman Greenspan explained:
"[plerhaps those organizations that either have or establish wellcapitalized and well-managed bank subsidiaries should be
permitted a small basket of nonfinancial assets .... ,
Then,
only later, as the success is measured of these developments,
should they consider fully dismantling the barrier between
banking and commerce. 346
As reported in the American Banker, one senior federal
regulator has stated that "[tlhe line between banking and
commerce is blurring, and e-commerce is driving it. [The GLB]
has tremendous flexibility built in for innovation and
experimentation." 34 The Board officials insist that the central
bank understands the reform law's goal: freeing financial
companies to innovate, compete, and adapt to changing market
conditions. During an interview, Fed. Governor Laurence Meyer
acknowledged that .'Gramm-Leach-Bliley
made a very
substantial break' with past law" and cautioned against "overly
conservative regulations that impede the direction that Congress
wanted the country to move in. 3 48 Comptroller of the OCC, John
D. Hawke, Jr., in an interview said that .'[tlhe business of
banking is changing all the time. With the advent of new
technology it's going to keep changing ....
It's an evolving
,,349
concept.
In support of the views expressed from the Board and OCC,
Congress also believes that the effect of changes in technology
will impact the business of banking, and its scope of activities.

342.
Id.
343.
See Statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials
of the Committee on Commerce, July 17, 1997, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 738 (Sept. 1997).
344. Id. at 742.
345.
Greenspan, supra note 341, at 253-54.
346.
See Greenspan, supra note 343, at 742.
347.
See Barbara A. Rehm, Commerce, a Reform Gem, in Fed's Hands, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 9, 2000, at 1.
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
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Congressman Jim Leach, who had previously stated that
"without [the GLB], every major bank would have been acquired
by a commercial company,"3 5' has more recently commented that
the "line between finance and commercial is a very difficult one
to draw; it is a line that moves .... From here out, it is a
principally regulatory, rather than legislative, issue.' 3 5'
GLB contains several provisions in its authorization of
merchant banking activities designed to distinguish merchant
banking investments specifically from the more general
considerations that deal with the mixing of banking and
commerce. In order to put a relatively bright line around
merchant banking, GLB defined permissible merchant banking
investments as investments that meet two important
requirements: 1) the investment may be held only for a period of
time to enable the resale of the investment, and, 2) while the
investment is held by the FHC, it may not routinely manage or
operate the commercial firm except as necessary or required to
obtain a reasonable return on the investment on resale.352 In
addition, GLB imposed limits on bank funding of portfolio
companies owned by the bank's parent holding company and on
cross-marketing activities between banks and portfolio
companies owned by the same financial holding company. 353
These restrictions were also intended to reinforce the separation
between banks and the commercial companies owned in reliance
on the new merchant banking authority.
Given the frequency with which the public must deal with
the term "commerce" - and similar marks such as "commercial" it may gradually be starting to realize that different goods and
services identified by the term "commerce" have different origins.
On balance, goods and services legally identified as "commerce"
will be separated from banking and financial services. They also
will be separated from some goods and services which are closely
related to banking and financial services.355
350.
It's Been More Effective than People Think, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7, 2000, at 1
(quoting Congressman Jim Leach in an interview with Barbara Rehm).
351.
Rehm, supra note 347.
352.
Kenneth J. Robinson, Banks Venture into New Territory, 1 ECON. & FIN. POL'Y
REV. 1, 4, 5 (2002) http://www.dallasfedreview.org/pdfs/v01 n02 a01.pdf, see generally
GLB §§ 102, 122, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), 1850 (2000).
353.
Id.
354. See Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the Committee on Finance (April 4, 2001), in 87 FED. RES. BULL.
403, 405, June 2001 (discussing the role of the U.S. in international trade and
competition).
355.
See Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 490, 499 (D. N.J. 1998), vacated by, remanded by 214 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2000).
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUSINESS DIVISIONS FROM BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

GLB embodies changes, particularly for banks, securities
firms and insurance companies, through its renovation of the
American financial services industry."' The enactment of the
Act, most significantly the creation of the financial holding
company with its newly created powers, opened new
opportunities for those industries. Banks, in particular, slowly
began adapting the new legislation to better accommodate their
customers' interests.357
The convergence of the various segments of the financial
services industry is far from complete -it may be that it has
barely begun -but two years after the passage of GLB, key
elements of a new financial services industry structure seems to
have coalesced, building a two-way street for banks to enter the
securities and insurance businesses and for brokers and insurers
to enter banking. Interestingly, banks seem more eager to enter
into the business of securities and insurance than the other way
around.35 ' This indicates a readiness of banks to adapt quickly
the new financial activities prohibited until the enactment of
GLB.
When the compromise on GLB was reached, the stock prices
of banks, securities firms, and insurance companies all
increased. 9 Particularly sharp increases occurred at BHCs and
securities firms that act as advisors in financial M&As as well as
at life insurance companies.6 ° Moreover, simulated mergers
across the financial services industries indicate that the largest
diversification benefits would result if BHCs combined with life
insurance firms.36 '
For example, the Citicorp/Travelers merger, which so far has
been a success story,6 2 provided the clearest indication yet that
356.
Geoffrey M. Connor, The Financial Services Act of 1999-The Gramm-LeachBliley Act, 71 PA. BAR ASS'N. Q. 29, 33 (2000).
357.
Anthony M. Santomero, The Causes and Effects of Financial Modernization,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the New Jersey Bankers Association (Mar. 17, 2001), in
PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 17, 2001, available at LEXIS, NEXIS Library, PR Newswire File
(explaining that a small number of all bank holding companies had converted to a FHC).
358.
See generally Rodger S. Lawson & Joyce Kraeger, Insurers, Banks Go Slow in
Wake of GLB, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROPERTY & CASUALTY- RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
Sept. 18, 2000, at 21.
359.
See Cara S. Lown, Summary of Session 1 Presentations,FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Oct. 2000, at 7, 9.
360.
Id. (reporting shareholders favored BHCs that undertook securities
underwriting prior to GLB's passage).
361.
Id. at 9.
362.
One analyst has argued that Citigroup's chairman and chief executive, Sandy
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much of the world envisioned by GLB already existed at the time
of its enactment.
Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota
acknowledged this reality by stating that '[m]any times
Congress shows up at the dance after the music is over."'3 3
Citigroup Inc. is the first global financial supermarket, with
assets of approximately USD 700 billion and more than one
hundred million customers." 4 It offers a complete array of
financial services, including commercial and consumer banking,
insurance underwriting and sales, securities brokerage and
underwriting, investment services and consumer finance.
Like
major commercial retail enterprises, such as Wal-Mart,
competing with smaller rural stores, Citigroup's lower costs and
diversification, offering various financial products and services,
give it a huge competitive advantage. Whether this advantage
will compensate for clashes in corporate cultures, duplications of
activities and mismatched businesses, remains to be seen. The
Citigroup merger gave managers opportunity to blend two
distinct cultures and give lenders and brokers an incentive to
work together. Some events, such as the loss of prior Citicorp
Chairman John S. Reed in open competition with Travelers
Chairman Sanford Weil, suggest that all is not yet at rest. Reed,
before his ouster, publicly viewed the merger as a success
stating, "[tlhe two institutions had virtually no businesses in
common, and the intent was to create a new institution spanning
the sum of all the businesses, integrating a full set of activities
around corporate and consumer customers and adding a global
dimension to Travelers." 36 6 Considering that Citicorp had client
relationships but no products to sell and Travelers had the
products but no client relationships, the merger gave Travelers a
broader sales platform and supplied Citigroup's global credit and
payment businesses with securities and insurance products.
Weill, who bought into Travelers in 1992 and built up his worldwide financial empire with
a series of large deals, including a merger with Citicorp in 1998, looked set to cash out of
the business at an opportune time. Citigroup stated it would spin off Travelers Property
Casualty in a two-part exercise. Citigroup will first sell up to 20 per cent of the company
in an initial public offering, expected in the first quarter of 2002. In addition to its
proceeds from the IPO, Citigroup will receive a dividend of about one billion dollars from
Travelers Property Casualty, to be paid in 2002. Gary Silverman, Citigroup Spin-Off to
Fund Purchases, Disposal of Travelers Property and Casualty Insurance Arm Marks
Strategy Retreat, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at 27.
363.
Dean Anason, Senate Passes Reform Bill, Gramm Calls for a Sequel, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1.

364. Bank/Insurance Mergers on the Cards in U.S., LIFE INS. INT'L, Oct. 31, 1999,
at 4, 1999 WL 11526444.
365.
See Barbara A. Rehm, Sole U.S. Triple-Threat, Citi Exploits its Edge, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 26, 2001, at 1.
366.
Id.
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Citigroup's goal of becoming a significant financial services
provider for retail customers, equipped also with the resources
that the bank and its affiliates command to achieve this goal,
undoubtedly presents a major competitive challenge for any size
financial services company."'
The Citicorp/Travelers merger has not unleashed a wave of
mergers among other major banks, insurers and securities firms
looking to establish global financial supermarkets. If Chase had
linked up with Merrill Lynch, that would have represented
another cross-industry connection. Chase, however, chose to
merge with J.P. Morgan, another large bank holding company,
indicating a basically conservative view of GLB or, perhaps, a
lack of imagination. The result has been positive but without the
expansive effects of the Citigroup merger. Market globalization,
along with pressure from corporate customers, will undoubtedly
spur further consolidation of banks into financial services
companies, seeking to offer a wider set of financial products and
services. In a speech at the Securities Industry Association's
annual meeting, William B. Harrison, Jr., chief of the newlycreated J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., said that the most successful
companies will be full-service firms that can handle everything
from banking to securities underwriting to merger advisory
services. "'If you look at global wholesale investment banking,
there may be only a handful of full-service end-game winners by
the end of this decade, down from several dozen major players
today.' Bigger is not only better, but absolutely mandatory,"'
Harrison said. 368 It seems that his acts did not quite match his
rhetoric.
So far, more than one hundred firms, the majority of them
banks, have sought the Board's permission to set up financial
holding companies under GLB,369 indicating that banks have
worked quicker than securities and insurance industries to adapt
to the new law for entering into new business activities to
increase their profits. Some will acquire new businesses and try
to integrate them. They also will cut overlapping costs and
attempt to gain economies of scale and scope and consequently,
drive down unit costs in the way of the vertically integrated 20th
Century financial institution.3 7 °
367.

Douglas P. Faucette, The Impact Of Convergence and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley

Act on the Insurance Industry, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 630 (2000).

368.
David Boraks, J.P. Morgan Chase Chief PraisesFull-Service Mode 1- For a Few,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 2001, at 1.
369.
Alan Levinsohn, The Coming of a Financial Services Bazaar?, STRATEGIC FIN.,
Apr. 1, 2000, at 4047.
370.

Id.
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Banking companies are moving into securities and
insurance, but there has not been much traffic in the other
direction. Of the one hundred new financial holding companies
only a few non-banks, including MetLife, have chosen to become
one.37' On one hand, the Board urges for patience, adding that
it's too soon to judge how well the central bank will use its power
to 'understand the overall entity [of the FHC] and the risks it
poses to the bank;' 37 2 on the other hand the securities and
insurance industries have assessed that over the near to medium
term, financial holding company status does not offer significant
enough benefits to them, given the associated costs. Those costs
include, in particular, the prospective burden of additional
regulation by the Board, onerous capital requirements and risk
examinations, a cumbersome rulemaking process, and vague
criteria for Board intervention into non bank subsidiaries. Also,
the non-participation
of the country's large insurance
underwriters, other than Travelers, in the formation of the new
financial services industry may be result of the mutuality and
limited stock history of the large insurance companies. The
mutual form of business organization has some advantages, but
acquisition experience and ability to adjust quickly to change are
not among them.
Financial institutions had hoped the Internet and new
technology would allow them to live out their visions of creating
financial supermarkets. Bankers have dreamed to broaden their
services from the more traditional services, such as checking and
savings accounts and offering loans, to giving investment advice,
purchasing insurance and trading stock.373 And doing it all on
line without the need for cost-heavy branch staff.
Banks look to integrating their businesses into financial
institutions which will ultimately emerge as too big to fail. Their
well-being will thus be underwritten by the word of the FDIC
backed by the financial strength (read full faith and credit) of the
United States. This fact is like the elephant at the picnic:
everyone is aware of it, but no one wants to mention it. The
FDIC and the Board appropriately maintain a constructive
371.
See id. MetLife became the first insurance company under GLB to receive
approval for the purchase of a federally chartered bank, Grand Bank of Kingston, N.J. in
February, 2001. Greg Davies, Insurers Bank on Brand; Is it Enough?, Oct. 10, 2001 at
Insurance
and
Technology
online,
http://www.insurancetech.com/itl/story/
IST20011010SO006.
372.
Barbara A. Rehm, In Focus: Critics Show Impatience with Fed's Implementation
of G-L-B, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 2001, at 1 (quoting Richard Spillenkothen, the Fed's top
Supervisor).
373.
Lauri Giesen, A Dream Come True?, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Apr. 2001,
at 20.
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ambiguity around this fact. However, the Board and its sister
bank regulatory agencies also are careful not to deny this
perception too vehemently or to prohibit by regulation the banks'
initiatives to get bigger. Neither have the anti-trust laws been
forcefully used to constrain bank mergers. Otherwise, the Board,
and other agencies, may find themselves tripping over their own
words someday. These institutions need not repeat the mistakes
of the 1930s to learn the lessons of that time.
Like Citigroup, other financial services organizations which
are already or are yet to be created, will expand into new
markets, products and services and face increased competition
brought by industry-wide consolidation. They will necessarily
look for greater economies of scale as a defensive measure.
Increasingly, these organizations will look to reduce the cost of
risk and expand the scope of their risk management efforts.
Cross-selling of new products and services will generate new
business, but also create privacy issues due to the sharing of
customer information. 7 4 Under GLB there will also be functional
regulation of the various financial businesses conducted by
financial holding companies including their banks. This will, of
course, be concentrated in the fields of securities (SEC functional
regulation) and insurance (functional regulation by the state
insurance regulators).
How this regulatory regime is
implemented will determine whether consumers receive the
intended benefit of the legislation....
Anticipations of a flurry of bank and insurance company
mergers have to the present time not materialized. 7
Roger
Lawson and Joyce Kraeger report that,
[both industries have adopted a "wait and see"
approach while regulators sort out their respective
roles under GLB's call for traditional and
functional regulation.
Many banks have been
reluctant to take on the risks associated with
insurance underwriting and have preferred

374.

See Robert Cox, GLB Act Will Change Bank Risks, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, RISK &
MGM'T, PROPERTY & CASUALTY, May 1, 2000, at 3 (discussing possible
consumer and regulator misgivings).
375.
Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Retail Delivery of Financial Services After the GrammLeach-Bliley Act: How will Public Policy Shape the "FinancialServices Supermarket"?,
4 N.C. BANKING INST. 39, 46 (2000).
376.
See John Kocjan & Mike Laporta, Comment: Why Bank-Insurer Mergers Don't
Make Sense, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 2000, at 7 (suggesting reasons that bank-insurance
combinations are unlikely to result in synergy).
BENEFITS
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instead to partner with or acquire insurance
agencies, accessing the distribution opportunities
presented by such partnerships to generate service
fees- something they know quite a bit about.3 77
As for insurers, while they continue to look at banks as an
additional distribution source and as a business creator in their
own areas of underwriting, their entry into the business of
banking largely appears to be occurring by means of the thrift
charter. 78
The continuing bank focus on agency activities reflects the
view of many bankers that they do not need to own the factory in
order to sell the product.3 79 A bank interested in insurance
products may indeed find the best of both worlds by partnering
with an insurance underwriter to devise new insurance products
that the bank may then sell to its customers, perhaps through its
own agency activities.3 8 There are a number of reasons banking
companies currently disfavor acquisition of an insurance
underwriter. First, the additional regulatory burdens of owning
an insurance underwriter and the risks posed by underwriting
have given some bankers pause to reflect on whether insurance
underwriting is in the long-term, best interests of their
shareholders. Furthermore, that insurance companies in general
have a lower return on equity than most banking institutions,
suggests that bank-insurance combinations would not be viewed
favorably by the market.3 8'
For an FHC to provide banking, insurance, and securities
services, while complying with the regulations, is an immense
burden. 82 These difficulties are a result of the disparity among
the regulations that govern each service.
Before GLB, the OCC
377.
See Rodger S. Lawson & Joyce Kraeger, Insurers, Banks Go Slow In Wake Of
GLB, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROPERTY & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGM'T, Sept. 18,
2000, Another Perspective, at 21.
378.
See Lee B. David, Banking-Mergers-Is Commercial Banking Still a Distinct
Line of Commerce, 57 TUL. L. REV. 958, 959-61 (1983) (explaining are three major types
of depository institutions in the United States).
379.
See Lee Ann Gjertsen, MassMutual Tailors Products for Bank Sales, AM.
BANKER, June 16, 2000, at 7 (describing MassMutual's development of products geared
towards bank customers).
380.
See generally James R. Kraus, ConsolidationAhead, U.S. BANKER, June 2000,
at 30 (predicting that small insurance companies will be replaced in the future by large
financial conglomerates who offer insurance as one of many products).
381.
See Bob Stein, Viewpoints: Look At The Numbers, And Don't Be So Ready to
Write Off Bank-Insurer Deals, THE AM. BANKER, June 30, 2000, at 9.
382.
Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 781 (2000).
383.
Id.
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nudged the Board to expand bank powers, but the GLB shifted
the balance of power to the Board. Under the GLB, Congress left
to the Board the responsibility of drawing the line between
finance and commerce, and between the products and services
that bank-owning companies may or may not offer. In particular,
once a non-bank agrees to become a financial holding company,
the Board can question its business movement from acquisitions
to product offerings. In other words, once the Board gets control
there is severely constrained. One expert went so far as to
describe the Board's engagement as "extortion" and added that
Congress should allow the OCC to define new "bank products"
and services, so that the banking industry will once again
384
experience regulatory competition between the Board and OCC.
Federal agencies and state regulators are required under the
GLB to share certain information and engage in coordinated
rulemaking.
Whether cooperation among these various entities
can be achieved and sustained remains to be seen.
How
functional regulators and the Board, as an FHC's oversight
regulator, will interact is also an open issue.38' The Board and
the OCC have taken very different views about their respective
regulatory roles under the GLB. For instance, Board Governor
Laurence Meyer has stated the Board 'needs to know more
about the activities within large insured depositary institutions
[such as national banks] than can be derived from access to
public information or from the reports of the primary bank
supervisors.' 387 Jerry Hawke, the Comptroller of the Currency
and functional regulator of national banks, contends that the
Board's role is 'helping to protect banks from risks that might
388
arise elsewhere in the corporate family, outside the bank.'
One commentator stated:
The GLB facilitates consolidation in the financial
services industry on both a national (more than
500 financial holding companies) and a cross384. See Barbara A. Rehm, In Focus: Critics Show Impatience With Fed's
Implementation of G-L-B, AM. BANKER, November 19, 2001, at 1 (quoting Charles W.
Calomiris, a finance professor at Columbia University's Graduate School of Business).
This is the prevailing view though not definitive.
385.
GLB § 307, 12 U.S.C. § 6716 (2000).
386.
See Eileen Canning, Fed's Ferguson Offers More Details on Fed's Role as
Umbrella Supervisor, 32 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 740 (2000) (describing the increased
coordination and cooperation that GLB requires between the FRB and functional
regulators).
387.
See Comptroller Pokes Holes in Fed's Umbrella, THE AM. BANKER, July 28,
2000, at 1.
388.
Id.
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border basis (for example, Charles Schwab/U.S.
Trust, Credit Suisse/Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette,
UBS/Painewebber, Dresdner Bank/WassersteinPerella, etc.)389 and pushes existing bank holding
companies to restructure their existing activities
in order to take advantage of the new powers
granted and comply with their attendant
requirements and conditions. It may cause many
bank holding companies that become FHCs to deal
with a new set of regulators, and may leave those
bank holding companies that cannot qualify as
FHCs to occupy niche positions in the new
financial services industry.3 90
During early 2000, cross-border consolidations had been
increasing; however,39 ' most of these consolidations were
composed of community banks and not the predicted "huge
conglomerates."39 2 Of the newly formed FHCs, seventy five
percent were comprised of bank holding companies whose assets
did not go past USD one billion.393
Now that insurance
companies can sell securities products, Allstate Insurance Co.,"'
for example, has begun selling mutual funds. Bill Howell,
president of the Insurance Education Foundation in Indianapolis
said, "[tlhat's what people want. They don't want to go to one
place to get insurance and one place to get stocks. They want to
go to one place to get their insurance, stocks and do their
banking."395
Securities firms, like insurance companies, have their own
set of competitive products and services. They are trying to fight
commercial banks that are offering cheap credit to their clients
and winning lucrative investment banking work such as
389.
See Clyde Mitchell, Financial Modernization - One Year Later!, N.Y. L.J.,
January 19, 2001, at 3.
390.
See Robert D. Webster & Glen R. Cuccinello, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Modernized U.S. Financial Services Industry, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUN., June
2000, at 17.
391.
Robert S. Lawson & Joyce Kraeger, Insurers, Banks Go Slow In Wake of GLB,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGM'T, Sept. 18, 2000,
at 21 (reporting that on March 23, 144 of these types of consolidations existed and on
May 12, 2000, 212 existed).
392.
Id.
393.
Id.
394. Allstate, Financial Products, at http://www.allstate.com/Finance/Financial
Products/pagerender.asp?page=main.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
395.
Philana Patterson, Industry Move to One-Stop-Shopping Increases Competition
in FinancialServices, THE BLACK COLLEGIAN ONLINE, at http://www.black collegian.com/
career/industry reports/onestop200-lst.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
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underwriting securities or advising on deals.39
Under such
competitive circumstances, securities firms are fighting back by
getting into the lending business, which historically has been
handled by commercial banks.397 Philip Purcell, the CEO and
Chairman of Morgan Stanley, believes the acceptance of lending
from the bank will require it "to move closer to the measured
culture of commercial" banking, thus building relationships with
clients.9 As a further possible result, the "pressure to do more
lending" may induce investment banks to combine with
commercial banks.9
To survive and be successful, commercial banks, securities
firms and insurance companies need to undergo radical changes
in their strategies and operations. They could achieve this by
implementing new approaches to designing and deploying
projects that allow these financial institutions to execute at
Internet speed in order to meet consumers' demands of the new
business world. Another strategy would be to perform "more
financial transactions online and integrat[e] the Internet
throughout the firm [to] redesign" financial operations, thus
eliminating factors not enhancing value and
"creat[ing] a
customer-centric organization by integrating customer service
information across their financial products" and services.4"' In
order to meet consumers' demands, these institutions must take
an active role in safeguarding the protection of the privacy of the
consumer data and information that these financial institutions
collect and exchange in the course of their activities.4"'
396.
See Gerard Baker & Gary Silverman, Fed Concern Over Venture Capital Flow,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at 10 (stating that the "big commercial banks such as Chase
Manhattan, Bank of America and Citigroup have allestablished affiliated [underwriting
and] venture capital units that in recent years have been investing.., in business startups", which have developed into a lucrative source of profit).
397.
See Rebecca Knight, Brokerages Diversify and Hope for Rebound, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31077730. For example, E'trade, the major on-line
securities/brokerage firm, entered, in the year 2001, the consumer lending business,
buying online mortgage originator LoansDirect. In an effort to provide more services,
including banking and credit cards. Id. Even a major player in investment banking like
Morgan Stanley has felt threatened by competition and invested USD "2 billion in capital
into a Utah banking subsidiary" in order to strengthen its lending department. Charles
Pretzlik & Gary Silverman, Morgan Stanley Boosts its Lending Capacity in Response to
Bank Rivals, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at 5.
398.
Id.
399.
Pretzlik & Silverman, supra note 397, at 1.
400.
See Financial Services Firms Toss Out Old Growth Strategies (Oct. 24, 2001),
Smartpros at http://accounting.smartpros.com/x31483.xml (discussing a Deloitte &
Touche report on the performance of banks, securities firms and insurance agencies for
the year 2001).
401.
See Therese Rutkowski, Privacy Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, INS. NETWORKING
& DATA MGM'T, June 2001 at 44 (explaining the "price insurers have had to pay for
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In passing GLB, Congress tried to establish the right
balance between the privacy needs of consumers and the needs of
financial institutions to use information to serve customers'
needs.
Today, financial institutions have more restrictions on
their use of customer information than any other industry.
Intense competition in the market is causing some firms to go
beyond these requirements and offer customers even more
protection. Most importantly, customers have been empowered,
because they now know how their information is being used, and
they have the final say over the use of this information,
even it
40 3
means to terminate business with their current firm.
The constitutional right to privacy is intertwined throughout
our Nation's history and its importance and its complexity is
engrained in our society.0 4 Unlike other banking issues in which
the public is apathetic towards, the provisions relating to privacy
in GLB strike a cord in the hearts of Americans.4 °5 In fact,
surveys have come to the conclusion that the public would
contest the distribution of information contained in their
accounts.4 °6
Within months of the enactment of the Financial
Modernization Act, non-banking industries made efforts to
incorporate thrift charters into their businesses. 4 07 In essence,
GLB increased the activities multi-thrift holding companies may
conduct, but it prohibited both the entrance into or its purchase
by companies not in the financial industry.
Moreover, thrift
holding companies held a lead over FHCs because there was not
a notice obligation towards the Board or OTS so it could institute
409
a new power.
Community banks are starting to realize that they should
not implement electronic services simply to have them, but
rather they are important to their competitive survival. They
modernization" and the extent the insurance companies had to change internal
procedures in order to comply with GLB).
402.
Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2002)
403.
See Alan E. Sorcher, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Privacy Rules Empower Consumers,
AM. BANKER, July 13, 2001, at 8.
404.
Robert A. Bennett, The Burden of Privacy, US BANKER, July 2000, at 55.
405.
Id.
406.
See id. (reporting a survey conducted by Synergistic Research Corp. that
concluded 85% felt such an opposition).
407.
Steven Marlin, Firms In Other Industries Move Rapidly To Add Banking
Services To Product Mix, BANK SYS. + TECH., Aug. 1, 2000, at 35.
408.
See Nicole Duran, In Brief: OTS: Multithrift Firms Have Full GLB Rights, AM.
BANKER, May 29, 2001.
409.
Id., at 4.
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should be used as a means of redesigning their business
processes by adding convenience and reducing operating costs.
GLB was a catalyst to increase the availability of the online
banking service.41 ° For the year 2001, community banks that
offered online banking increased from 55% to 75%.411 This
occurrence has caused
community banks to use the Internet to
412
remain competitive.
Although the insurance industry is concerned about the
scope of the "umbrella" regulation by the Board under GLB, it
may be ready to accept this based upon the 50-state insurance
regulation to which it is already subject. 413 The Chairman of the
Board, Alan Greenspan, said that he had not considered
4 14
suggestions for a federal charter when asked in 200 1.
Greenspan went on to indicate that the ramifications for each
state to have separate legal rules would be for companies to have
to seek the advice of lawyers rather than risk managers.415 Such
an occurrence would not be in the best interest of companies and
Greenspan indicated a federal charter would be "irresistible. 416
Since June of 2000, there has been a movement for U.S.
banking groups to change their status to FHCs through the filing
of an election under GLB.417 In the international market, the
movement has not been as strong, with only fourteen foreignbased banking groups having filed elections. 418 Before GLB was
passed, a majority of its support for its enactment came from
foreign universal banks. 419 The rationale for the foreign support
for GLB is based on the fact that if a separate foreign bank and
foreign insurance company had offices in the U.S. and they
desired to merge their U.S.-based offices, then the previous U.S.
law would have required one of them to divest within five
420
years.
410.
Maria Bruno, E-Mania Takes Community Banks by Storm: According to Grant
Thornton, Community Banks Must Commit to Big Changes, or Else, BANK TECH. NEWS,
May 2001, at 4.
411.
Id.
412.
Id.
413.
See Rob Garver, GLB Matchup: Big Insurers, Small Banks, THE AM. BANKER,
Dec. 1, 2000, at 1.
414.
Michele Heller et al., In Defense of GLB, AM. BANKER, May 14, 2001, at 4.
415.
Id.
416.
Id.
417.
See Raphael Soifer, Banking Services: Banks Fail To Get In On The Act - The
Take-up Rate Among International Banks To Become Financial Holding Companies In
The US Has Been Relatively Low, THE BANKER, Oct. 1, 2000, at 896.

418.
Id.
419.
Id.
420.
Id. (describing that such divestment would "be sufficiently onerous to preclude
the European merger in the first place").
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Although GLB was forecasted to facilitate the expansion of
European financial institutions into the U.S. market, it will
actually be a secondary incentive as compared with "European
economic integration as well as the technological revolution. 4 2'
"Banks and insurance companies will merge, although the muchballyhooed European banc assurance paradigm has not been
without its rough spots."4 22 Norbert Walter, chief economist for
the Deutsche Bank Group, said "[tlhe experience with banc
assurance has not been encouraging. Obviously, there are
cultural differences, but we have to find ways of coexistence of
the different
cultures; if we are not capable of doing that we will
42 3
ose.

Not soon thereafter the passage of GLB did various trade
groups initiate organizations.4 4 One such organization that
arose was the American Bankers Insurance Association, which
was a merger between the "Bankers Association, Insurance
Association and the Association of Banks in Insurance."42 5 Beth
Climo, the executive director of American Bankers Insurance
Association stated:
As more bankers take advantage of these
opportunities, it's important that they have one
place they can turn to for information and
support .... "That is what ABIA will be.... Our
mission is to increase financial institutions' ability
to offer insurance and annuity products.... We
think we will be a valuable partner for banks in
the insurance business.426
With passage of the Act, Congress has set the course of the
financial services industry. Technological advancements, the
growing sophistication of customer attitudes and diversification
of consumer financial needs will continue to produce new
investment options. Thus, the traditional providers of financial
products and services -insurance companies, banks, securities
firms -will have to continue to diversify the types of products
421.
Steve Tuckey, It Changes Tops GLB on Global Scene, INS. ACCT, Mar. 6, 2000,
at 1.
422.
Id.
423.
Id.
424.
New Group ForPost-GLB Era, INS. CHRONICLE, June 4, 2001, at 15.
425.
Id. (describing the purpose of this newly formed association as "serv[ing] as a
non-profit affiliate of the ABA as a full service insurance association for the banking
industry").
426.
Id.
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they offer to remain competitive.
The usefulness of crossindustry consolidation as a tool for achieving diversification will
no doubt continue to grow. Now that the antiquated antiaffiliation provisions have been removed, the pace will only
quicken.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of GLB categorized the business divisions in
the perspective of the U.S. banking industry as follows:
"banking," "closely related to banking," "financial in nature,"
"complementary to a financial activity," and "non-financial in
nature" or "commerce." These divisions are distinguished by
defining the specific role each one plays in the U.S. banking
industry. The role of federal and state regulatory agencies in
banking, securities, insurance and other related financial areas
will be to define clearly and issue regulations which better
facilitate the competition of banks and bank holding companies
in the different business areas.
Most important, the financial market has become so
competitive, and the technology so improved, we hope that the
agencies, Congress, and the courts will assist and coordinate
their work efficiently in order to allow financial institutions to
use their business sense effectively in making U.S. banking
industry more competitive and responsive to market needs.
Business should be driven by market needs, not by elegant legal
interpretations.
The banks choosing to become FHCs and the national banks
electing to utilize GLB to conduct activities through subsidiaries
are dependent on that charter. An enticing selection of business
devices awaits. State banks can become BHCs; they might elect
a national charter and operate as a national bank charter. Some
activities might be subject to supervision under still another
agency; for example, securities activities by the SEC or insurance
through state insurance agencies.
The power sharing between the Board and the Treasury
(OCC)for defining new "financial in nature" activities for FHCs
or for bank subsidiaries beyond those now available may increase
the Board's creative role as regulator in order to make banks
more competitive. One must await the effect of these challenges
within the Board, which, with few exceptions, has not been
regarded as a leader in innovative banking regulation. Creative
regulation has more typically been found in the chartering
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agencies, federal and state,4 27 and in the courts, which, one hopes,
will see themselves as part of the future of banking.
Competition rather than stultifying regulation among banks
and other financial institutions would be consistent within the
underlying principles of U.S. banking law, principles reaffirmed
in GLB. It is also hoped that competition among regulatory
agencies will continue to provide measures of regulatory
efficiency and expertise in defining the permissible activities to
be carried out by FHCs and banks. Protection against abuse of
restrictive regulatory authority from the agencies will, as always,
be found through active participation from the courts and
Congressional oversight.
The Board's challenges in the implementation of GLB will
not end simply through the adoption of a few rules and
regulations. The real measure of the Board's performance will be
the interagency cooperation necessary for the increasingly large
and complex financial organizations that GLB authorized, and
the market and technology are creating. The FHCs are no longer
simply banks, securities firms, or insurance companies. They are
something different - conglomerates - and it will take skill to
represent the public interest in supervising them. The goal must
not be the expansion of the agencies' jurisdiction so much as the
fulfillment of a responsibility to the public.12 ' The fencing now in
progress between the OCC and the Board does not augur well for
this process.
GLB erased a majority of financial regulations that
dominated for the past sixty years and catalyzed market-oriented
modernization.4 29 American consumers and businesses could be
benefited by this development. 43 0
Not the least of the regulators' challenges will be to
shepherd the financial services industry through thickets of
cynicism. Free markets provide the potential for productive
creativity.
They also are breeding grounds for greed and
427.
See Carter Golembe, Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: The Great Leap
Forward, GOLEMBE REPORT, July 2001, at 7 (discussing the definition of "federal dual
banking").
428.
See Laurence H. Meyer, Implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: One Year
Later, Remarks Before the American Law Institute and American Bar Association
(Feb. 15, 2001), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010215/
default.html.
429.
See John S. Barry, Creating a FinancialServices Industry for the 21' t Century
Part 1: Tear Down the Walls, Jul. 5, 1996, available at LEXISNEXIS, News Library,
ALLNEWS File.
430.
Id. "More profitable investments could be available; capital could be easier to
obtain, and its cost could be reduced; and the financial services sector could enjoy more
stability and security." Id.
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corruption, one need only read the morning newspaper. The
savings and loan disaster was not too long ago. The regulators
are in the key position to ensure that increased freedom of
operation does not mean the reduction of honesty. The future is
uncertain as to whether GLB can provide the benefits its
sponsors imagined is a question yet to be answered.43 '
Finally, GLB enables us to predict the future. With the
exception of complementary activities43 2 and merchant banking,
nothing has been done to connect banking with the vast arena of
ordinary, non-financial commerce. We must be prepared to
consider the merger of banks and automobile manufacturers and
giant retailers. Clearly, such a development is on the horizon. It
is already being discussed and, as we have pointed out, 433 there
are those who believe that it has already been accomplished.
Abolition of the present barriers could, however, take place only
when the banking and financial institutions prove that GLB has
worked properly and accomplished the advantages promised by
the law. If this is achieved successfully, these institutions would
"force" Congress and the regulatory authorities to allow them
into the next level of market freedom and authorize expanded
business in order to achieve a greater diversification of products,
greater safety from a more diversified portfolio mix and, not to be
forgotten, larger profits. Nobody can predict when this will
happen. Old traditions die hard, GLB itself is proof of this.
However, what is predictable is that Congressional regulators
and the public will monitor closely the impact of GLB upon the
U.S. financial system and behave consistently with the
experience.

431.
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 199, at 42.
432.
Supra Part V.
433.
Peter J. Wallison, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Eliminated the Separation of
Banking and Commerce, How This Will Affect the Future of the Safety Net, Address
Before the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition (May 5, 2000), at 4 & n.2, 5.

